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COUNTRY ANALYSIS REPORT



INTERNATIONAL DAY TO END IMPUNITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST JOURNALISTS

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Executive Summary

Pakistan's political, economic and security environment remains under considerable strain, with persistent governance challenges, uneven economic recovery and mounting pressures on democratic institutions and civic freedoms The report identifies a recurring gap between state interventions and their implementation, particularly in areas requiring institutional coordination and public accountability. Political uncertainty, weak productive investment and inadequate public services continue to constrain stability, while climate vulnerability and restrictions on civic freedoms expose deeper governance challenges.

The immediate political crisis centres on the federal intervention in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), where emergency and governor's rule have transferred authority from an elected provincial government to an appointed administration. Parliamentary endorsement has not resolved constitutional questions surrounding the intervention, while legal challenges before the Peshawar High Court and the reported detention of senior provincial leaders have intensified concerns over due process. New administrative arrangements across 12 districts, including an Area Development Secretariat and an Area Representative and Development Council, raise further questions about provincial autonomy, local representation and institutional accountability. The announcement of Rs160 billion in development funding also requires transparent allocations and effective public oversight to establish whether these measures improve conditions in underserved districts.

Economic stabilisation has strengthened external financial indicators, with foreign exchange reserves reaching approximately $21 billion and the fiscal deficit reported at 2.6% of GDP. However, growth remains modest, September inflation reached 10.3% and the current account recorded a deficit of $874 million in the first quarter of FY2026-27. Poverty, high energy costs and uneven tax enforcement continue to constrain households and businesses. The reported closure of more than 500 cotton-ginning units illustrates the pressure on domestic productive capacity. Sustained recovery will require broader tax compliance, predictable economic policies and investment in exports and productive infrastructure.

Pakistan's diplomatic relationships are increasingly shaped by regional conflict and competing security priorities. The trilateral defence agreement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signals closer military cooperation, while Islamabad's engagement with Tehran reflects efforts to prevent further escalation in the Gulf and protect regional energy routes. Relations with Afghanistan remain strained by repeated border clashes and disagreements over the presence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters on Afghan territory. These developments threaten regional connectivity, trade and domestic economic stability. Maintaining diplomatic channels and preventing further escalation will remain important to managing these pressures.

Security conditions are deteriorating across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where Pakistani authorities report more than 2,800 militant attacks since January. Balochistan's insurgency has become more widespread, while renewed exchanges of fire along the Afghan border have resulted in civilian casualties. A security strategy centred primarily on military operations risks overlooking local grievances and the political conditions sustaining conflict. Effective counterterrorism will require credible negotiations, local political ownership, stronger civilian institutions and coordinated action between federal and provincial governments.

Social and humanitarian pressures expose persistent inequalities in access to essential services and legal protection. Approximately 25 million children aged 5–16 remain out of school, including 13.4 million girls, while education expenditure declined to 0.8% of GDP in 2024-25. Women also face significant barriers to breast cancer diagnosis and treatment, including high costs and limited specialist services. Allegations surrounding police encounters in Punjab have renewed concerns about extrajudicial killings and due process. Meanwhile, Pakistan's record of impunity for crimes against journalists remains alarming: 41 journalists have been murdered since 1992, with no accountability in 36 cases. Legal pressure, intimidation and restrictions on reporting further threaten independent journalism and the public's right to information.

Climate governance remains constrained by weak coordination between forecasting agencies, provincial departments and local authorities. The 2022 floods and the 2025 Buner disaster demonstrate how inadequate warning communication and unclear institutional responsibilities can undermine preparedness and recovery. Exclusion from emergency assistance and the absence of a unified loss-and-damage registry further complicate reconstruction and access to climate finance. Priorities include binding data-sharing protocols, stronger local government involvement in disaster response and transparent climate expenditure. Across these areas, Pakistan's resilience will depend on institutions that can translate evidence into coordinated action, protect civic freedoms and deliver accountable public services.

International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists

Observed every year on 2 November, the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists draws attention to a global crisis: UNESCO reports that nearly nine out of ten killings of journalists remain judicially unresolved. Impunity denies justice to journalists and their families, but its effects reach far beyond them. When reporters are punished for exposing corruption, abuse or crime, the public loses access to information it needs to hold power to account.

Pakistan's record makes that warning immediate. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reports that at least 41 journalists have been murdered in Pakistan since 1992; in 36 cases, nobody has been held accountable, while the remaining cases have seen only partial accountability. Pakistan has appeared on CPJ's Global Impunity Index every year since it began in 2008.

The case of Sindhi journalist Shan Dahar illustrates how accountability can fail at multiple stages. Dahar was shot and killed in January 2014 while reporting in Larkana. A 2026 investigation by Free Press Unlimited, CPJ and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) found serious flaws in the original police investigation, including omissions and inconsistencies. The sole suspect previously prosecuted was acquitted in 2018. Irfan Brohi, another suspect, was arrested on April 2, 2026, but was released on bail; his brother Aamir and he had earlier been declared absconders. The arrest has not resolved the case. The organisations have called for a transparent reinvestigation led by a senior police officer, with independent monitoring.

The danger is not limited to murder. Freedom Network documented 142 violations against journalists and media professionals between November 2024 and September 2025, nearly 60 per cent more than in the previous year. Its report also recorded 36 legal cases against 30 media practitioners under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act and the Pakistan Penal Code. The International Federation of Journalists' 2025-26 report records at least three journalists murdered and describes arrests, assaults and legal action, including two life terms and an additional 35-year sentence imposed in absentia on four journalists in January 2026. Taken together, the reports show how legal pressure, intimidation and violence can narrow the space in which journalists are able to report.

Ending impunity requires protecting journalists who report threats, investigating promptly and independently, preserving evidence, prosecuting those responsible, and keeping victims' families informed. It also means ensuring that laws and institutions protect journalists' ability to work rather than intimidate them into silence. On October 23, the International Federation of Journalists and the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists marked four years since Arshad Sharif's killing and said no perpetrator had been arrested or prosecuted.

A recent PEMRA directive also raises concerns about the conditions in which journalists can report security incidents: it restricts live coverage of explosions, shootings and terrorist attacks, and requires broadcasters to rely on information verified by government departments or law-enforcement agencies. The Committee to Protect Journalists warned that these restrictions could limit independent reporting and give officials control over information during crises. Until journalists can report safely and independently, impunity will threaten not only the press but every citizen's right to know.



Political Updates

Parliament's endorsement of emergency rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa gave the federal government some political support for its intervention. It did not resolve whether the constitutional conditions for the intervention had been met or how the new administration would be held accountable to the people of the province. The Peshawar High Court has issued notices in petitions challenging the measures and adjourned the hearing to November 10. On October 15, the opposition alliance Tehreek Tahafuz Aiyeen-e-Pakistan (TTAP) also called off negotiations with the federal government over the emergency and governor's rule. The court's review and the breakdown in talks keep both the legal and political disputes open.

One argument now circulating is that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's government must avoid confrontation with the Centre, maintain good relations with powerful institutions and set protest politics aside because that is how it can secure resources and govern. Cooperation between governments is necessary, but treating it as a favour exchanged for political compliance misrepresents the relationship. Article 160 provides for the National Finance Commission (NFC) to recommend how federal revenues and grants are distributed between the federation and the provinces. In its 2025-26 budget, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) projected federal transfers of about Rs1.15 trillion as its share of federal taxes, plus Rs138 billion under its one per cent allocation for the war on terror. Because these transfers make up a substantial part of KP's revenue, their timely release and transparent accounting are important. The Constitution gives provinces a formal role in the NFC process and a basis to seek clarity on the transfers due to them.

Political protest and service delivery are also too often presented as competing choices. Peaceful assembly and political association are constitutionally protected. Protests may disrupt daily life, but that alone does not invalidate the protesters' demands or show that their party has lost public support. In 2024, PTI-backed independent candidates won a landslide victory during the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly election. In a democratic state, electoral legitimacy should be established at the ballot box rather than presumed from predictions or political commentary.



Source: Arab News

That distinction can also be applied to the security debate. The rise in terrorism makes scrutiny of policing, provincial administration and federal-provincial coordination urgent, but it does not identify which decisions or actors caused the increase.

Accountability should follow evidence about responsibilities, resources and results. Treating security or service delivery as reasons to delegitimise protest weakens the democratic oversight that can help expose failures and press governments to act.

Another related development is that the federal government has moved quickly to establish new arrangements for 12 designated districts. The Area Development Secretariat has begun assigning officials to portfolios that include security, education, health, finance, and development. An Area Representative and Development Council has also been formed to advise on local needs. The stated purpose is to improve coordination and direct attention to districts facing serious security and development challenges.

Officials have not explained how the new secretariat will coordinate spending and security operations across agencies, or how it will be held accountable for results.

The mandates of the new bodies remain unclear. The province now has a governor-led administration, a federal committee overseeing provincial affairs, a secretariat with responsibilities across 12 districts and a council intended to represent those districts. On October 28, the Election Commission of Pakistan directed local government elections to proceed in districts where delimitation was complete, while excluding the 12 districts covered by the Area Representative and Development Council (ARDC) arrangements. The available information does not yet make clear how these bodies will coordinate with each other or with the provincial bureaucracy, or how local representation will operate in the excluded districts.



Source: The News

If their mandates overlap, officials may defer decisions or shift responsibility. If they operate independently, they may weaken the province-wide systems needed for services such as health and education. Clear mandates, reporting lines, and public accountability will be necessary to assess whether the new arrangements improve administration.



Source: Dawn News

On October 22, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced Rs160 billion for development in KP, with particular emphasis on the merged and underserved districts. On October 26, the Central Development Working Party cleared three KP infrastructure projects worth about Rs100 billion and recommended them to the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council for formal approval. Both announcements should be judged by implementation. The government has yet to show how the Rs160 billion will be divided among projects, how quickly it will be released, or how residents will monitor spending. Because the administration is appointed, public disclosure and oversight matter even more as residents have fewer direct ways to influence executive decisions.

The Area Representative and Development Council also faces a question of political acceptance. On October 25, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl's provincial chapter instructed party members appointed to the council to resign, describing the emergency measures as undemocratic. This shows that the new arrangement has not secured consensus among significant political actors in the province. If the council is to provide local input, its membership and decision-making role will need to be seen as credible by communities and political groups beyond those willing to serve on it.

The legal challenge is proceeding alongside the administrative transition. On October 20, the Peshawar High Court issued notices to the federal and provincial governments on petitions challenging the emergency and governor's rule. The hearing was adjourned until November 10, and the court has not yet ruled on the merits. The petitions question whether the constitutional conditions for the intervention were met, including the requirement for provincial assembly approval. In a separate proceeding, on October 22 the court sought reports by November 3 from senior officials on the whereabouts and legal status of Chief Minister Sohail Afridi, Speaker Babar Saleem Swati and other PTI leaders reportedly in custody. These proceedings leave both the constitutionality of the measures and the detention of political leaders before the courts.

Governor Faisal Karim Kundi's comments have added uncertainty about the intended duration of the arrangements. He said Chief Minister Sohail Afridi and Assembly Speaker Babar Saleem Swati were under house arrest and "in safe hands"; he also suggested that the arrangement might continue beyond six months. The two proclamations have different constitutional rules. Governor's rule under Article 234 cannot remain in force for more than six months, while emergency rule follows a separate framework. Public statements about extending the arrangement should therefore be precise about which measure they refer to and the legal process governing it.

The governor's comments about Afridi and Swati also leave unresolved questions about the legal basis for their detention and the process for reviewing it. Former justice Wajihuddin Ahmed has argued that the law provides no basis for placing a sitting chief minister in "protective custody" and that the courts should examine the matter. Describing individuals as safe does not answer whether they are being held under a valid order, what restrictions apply, or when they will be brought before a court. Those questions require clear official information and lawful procedure.

PTI has not responded with an immediate province-wide protest. On October 27, its KP leadership said the party had avoided demonstrations to protect workers from arrests and violence, while calling for a coordinated political and legal response. Avoiding demonstrations may reduce the chance of immediate clashes. PTI will now need to sustain its opposition through the courts, parliament and engagement with other parties.

If insecurity persists, responsibility cannot indefinitely be placed on a provincial government whose authority has been suspended. Likewise, any reduction in violence will need to be assessed alongside its effects on civil liberties, public services and political participation.

Over the next few weeks, the federal government will need to show measurable improvements, explain its decisions and follow the constitutional process. Without such evidence, the new structure may deepen the perception that federal rule is being used to manage political conflict. That perception would make future cooperation between Islamabad and provincial governments more difficult, including when both levels of government need to coordinate against militancy.

Economic Updates

Pakistan has reduced immediate macroeconomic pressures, but recent indicators point to a recovery that remains narrow and vulnerable. Following the fourth review of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, the fiscal deficit was reported at 2.6 per cent of GDP, the primary surplus strengthened, and the current account was broadly balanced. Foreign exchange reserves rose from a low of $4.3 billion in FY2023 to around $21 billion, providing about three months of import cover. External public debt was reported at 25 per cent of GDP, while the share of short-term external debt fell from 24 to 16 per cent, partly after a Saudi deposit was converted into a three-year facility. Stronger reserves and a lower share of short-term debt ease some near-term pressure, but they have not yet led to stronger investment, exports or employment.

The growth outlook remains modest. On October 26, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) raised its policy rate by 50 basis points to 12 per cent, citing inflation risks from the Gulf conflict, high energy prices and domestic wheat supply frictions. September inflation was 10.3 per cent, still above the SBP's 5-7 per cent target. The SBP projected growth of 3.5-4.5 per cent for FY27, while the governor put growth for FY26 at 3.7 per cent. Remittances were expected to reach $45 billion, but the governor said exports were improving without yet meeting the economy's needs; imports were estimated at nearly $71 billion. The current account recorded a deficit of $874 million in the first quarter of FY2026-27, while the SBP projected the full-year deficit to remain within 0-1 per cent of GDP. These projections remain exposed to energy-price volatility, conflict-related supply disruptions and adverse weather.




Source: Pexels

The improvement in national accounts has not translated into relief for many households. World Bank estimates that poverty had risen to 25.3 per cent on the national line, while close to 45 per cent of Pakistanis were below the Bank's $4.20-a-day threshold. Investment was reported at around 14 per cent of GDP, and poverty, scarce jobs and weak public services continue to constrain domestic demand and productive capacity. The stabilisation effort has also involved high interest rates, energy costs and taxes that weigh on businesses. The cotton-ginning sector illustrates how high operating costs and disruptive tax enforcement can weaken productive capacity.

Unannounced Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) raids in Sindh prompted factory owners to threaten shutdowns, while ginners point to high electricity tariffs and a sales tax burden of 18-22 per cent. Industry estimates indicate that more than 100 ginning factories became non-functional in 2025-26, bringing cumulative closures to over 500 ginning units and nearly 700 oil mills. Continued contraction would reduce domestic cotton processing and put further pressure on agricultural and textile supply chains.

Tax policy remains a constraint on investment and growth. The concentration of roughly 90 per cent of withholding tax collection in just 10 heads points to a narrow, uneven system that relies heavily on established collection channels rather than broad-based compliance. Reform should harmonise sales tax, make policy more predictable and measure performance through compliance and efficiency, not revenue totals alone. Publishing monthly FBR revenue data under uniform accounting rules, alongside the finance ministry's monthly expenditure statements, would make fiscal trends easier to assess. This transparency would help determine whether new measures are widening the tax base or adding to the burden on businesses and individuals already within the system.

External stability has been supported by active reserve accumulation. The SBP had bought $30 billion from the interbank market over four years, using about $12 billion for interest payments and the remainder to build reserves. It said the SBP was targeting reserves of $23 billion by December 2026 and $25 billion by June 2027. However, the rupee's real effective exchange rate had reached 109, its highest level since 2018, and currency stability alongside continued reserve purchases could limit growth beyond 4 per cent if the exchange rate remained uncompetitive. Building reserves reduces external risks, while an uncompetitive rupee can make exports and domestic production less viable. The challenge is to rebuild buffers without undermining growth.



Source: Berecorder

Growth also depends on investment in resilience and productive infrastructure. Households, farmers and shopkeepers imported about 17 gigawatts of solar panels in each of 2024 and 2025, largely using their own savings in response to diesel costs and energy subsidies being unwound. The subsequent taxation of panel imports and changes to net-metering terms risk weakening that citizen-led investment.


Source: Arab News

Domestic disruptions could further undermine the transition to growth. In KP and Balochistan, conflict and poverty reinforce one another; security measures need to be accompanied by dialogue, jobs and public services, with federal and provincial governments jointly responsible for a practical counterterrorism plan. Disruptions to transport can delay factory inputs, exports and farmers' access to urban markets, raising costs and creating shortages. Internet shutdowns also interrupt payments, logistics and the work of freelancers and IT exporters. Finally, proposals for new provinces or administrative units could divert resources into new bureaucracies and weaken fiscal coordination unless they are grounded in constitutional clarity, fiscal assessment and political consensus. Strengthening local governments within existing arrangements offers a more immediate route to improving services.

Continuity in reforms will matter, but so will the quality and distribution of the adjustment.

Diplomatic Landscape

Pakistan's diplomatic landscape is being shaped by three connected pressures: heightened conflict in the Gulf, a worsening security relationship with Afghanistan, and the need to protect domestic stability from regional shocks. Islamabad is engaging partners across the region while facing difficult choices over security commitments, mediation and the economic costs of prolonged conflict. Its central diplomatic challenge is to preserve room for dialogue as tensions rise on several fronts at once.

The trilateral defence agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye gives this balancing act a formal dimension. The agreement's published text says an externally originating armed attack on one signatory would be treated as an attack on all, invoking the right of self-defence under the UN Charter. It also provides for joint defence production, intelligence sharing and closer military coordination. The agreement does not provide for offensive action, and Türkiye's foreign minister has described it as defensive and ruled out sending Turkish troops to a foreign theatre. On October 28, Türkiye's parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee approved the agreement and referred it to the General Assembly for consideration and a vote; it has therefore not yet completed the Turkish parliamentary process. Its practical implications will depend on how the signatories interpret and implement it.



Source: The Washington Post

At the same time, Pakistan is seeking to prevent the Gulf conflict from widening. Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir's October visit to Tehran followed earlier discussions with Iranian leaders aimed at preventing escalation and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. On October 24, Iran's ambassador said Tehran remained open to resuming talks with the United States and had proposed reopening the Strait if Washington lifted its naval blockade. This reported offer points to the diplomatic conditions still separating the two sides; Pakistan's efforts to keep communication open reflect its interest in preventing further disruption to regional energy flows, which can raise import costs, add to inflation and put pressure on its current account. Islamabad therefore has reason to sustain channels with Tehran and other Gulf actors, even as it deepens defence ties with Riyadh and Ankara.

Domestic resilience is closely tied to this diplomatic agenda. High energy prices and interruptions to shipping can compound inflation and external-account pressures; renewed border violence can further burden communities in already vulnerable provinces. Diplomacy cannot remove every external risk, but it can help contain escalation, protect trade routes and keep negotiations open.

Social and Humanitarian Updates

Education access remains a major concern, particularly for girls and children in climate-affected communities. About 25 million Pakistani children aged 5-16 are out of school, including 13.4 million girls. Combined federal and provincial education spending fell to 0.8 per cent of GDP in 2024-25, from 1.9 per cent in 2019-20, while the 2022 floods damaged or destroyed nearly 27,000 schools. Poverty, household costs, unsafe journeys and disrupted schooling continue to push girls out of education, limiting future opportunities and deepening existing inequalities.



Source: The News

Access to timely, affordable healthcare is also uneven. Pakistan recorded an estimated 30,700 new breast cancer cases and 15,500 deaths among women in 2022. Diagnosis alone does not ensure treatment: patients face costly medicines and tests, shortages, administrative barriers, and repeated travel to specialist hospitals. These burdens are particularly severe for women outside major cities and can lead to delayed or incomplete care. Reliable supplies of essential medicines, affordable diagnostics and public reporting on treatment waiting times and completion would help identify and address gaps.

Concerns about due process and public trust have also followed recent alleged police encounters in Punjab. Lawyers and journalists questioned the killing of a suspect in Multan after the Crime Control Department said he had escaped custody and was later killed in an exchange of fire. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has alleged that the department uses staged encounters, while the CCD rejects those claims. The incidents have renewed scrutiny of whether criminal justice institutions can ensure fair investigation and trial. Extrajudicial killings, even when suspects face serious accusations, risk weakening confidence in the rule of law and the state's duty to protect the rights of all citizens.

Security Updates

Pakistan's security pressures are intensifying across the northwest and Balochistan. Pakistani authorities say more than 2,800 militant attacks since January have killed or wounded 3,000 people, mainly in these regions. Balochistan's insurgency has become more lethal and widespread: one account cited 176 attacks in July, killing 438 people, including 127 security personnel. These figures point to a serious challenge for the state.

In Balochistan, a security strategy centred on force risks overlooking the local grievances that help sustain recruitment and support networks. External backing may contribute to the insurgency, but treating it as solely a foreign proxy conflict can crowd out political engagement. Earlier initiatives combining talks, development and amnesty were not sustained. Any counterinsurgency plan should combine security operations with credible negotiations, local political ownership and action on the grievances described above.

The most immediate security challenge, however, is along the Afghan border. The Associated Press reported renewed exchanges of fire in Kurram district, with Pakistani officials saying artillery destroyed Taliban posts and troops killed militants attempting to cross into Pakistan. Afghanistan's Taliban government had not commented at the time of that report. A further border incident was reported on October 27: mortar fire in South Waziristan killed one civilian and injured five, according to local officials cited by AP. The clashes come amid repeated border incidents and Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan. Pakistan says Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders and fighters are operating from Afghan territory; Kabul denies providing them sanctuary. This dispute has become a major obstacle to stable relations between the two countries.



Source: Tribune

Climate Change Related Updates

Pakistan has forecasting and hazard data, but warnings have not consistently led to timely local action. During the 2022 floods, the Pakistan Meteorological Department had forecast an above-normal monsoon, while household, river, and satellite data were held across government agencies. Yet the information was not brought together under a clear duty to inform action. The same problem was evident in Buner in August 2025: a red alert was issued, but households did not evacuate because warnings were not translated into clear instructions and local governments had no assigned role in delivering them. Forecasting capacity matters, but its value depends on whether people receive actionable guidance in time.



Source: Brittanica

The institutional gaps extend from early warning to recovery. Federal agencies holding hazard data reportedly lack a shared protocol, while disaster management and irrigation responsibilities sit with provinces under the post-18th Amendment system. Evidence must therefore move across federal and provincial institutions both to secure financing and to deliver assistance, without a clear chain of responsibility. After the 2022 floods, emergency cash transfers reached households already listed in the national registry; in some districts, exclusion among affected households was estimated at one-third, and nearly half of unregistered households reportedly did not know how to register. Pakistan also lacks a unified loss-and-damage registry linking damage assessments to reconstruction. This weakens both recovery planning and the country's ability to document losses for climate finance.

Climate risk is also a recurring fiscal and development cost. Floods in 2010, 2022 and 2025 damaged infrastructure and diverted public resources from planned investment to relief and reconstruction. A more resilient approach would estimate expected provincial losses from floods, heat and drought, protect maintenance budgets for existing assets such as embankments, canals and drains, and screen local projects for climate risks. The 2022 experience also points to the need to fund the full warning chain from risk assessment and forecasting to communication and response. The Global Commission on Adaptation has estimated that 24 hours' warning can reduce storm damage by 30 per cent.

The immediate priorities are to establish binding data-sharing protocols, assign an owner for damage and recovery data, connect household registries with hazard maps, and give local governments a formal role in warnings and response. Climate finance should strengthen capabilities within provincial departments so that expertise and systems remain after donor projects end. Pakistan has substantial climate and household data; the pressing task is to ensure that an institution is responsible for carrying that evidence into decisions before the next emergency.

Reading Recommendations

- Reviving the Role of Youth in Pakistan's Social and Political Life (Click Here)
- From Digital Ambition to Democratic Trust: Charting Pakistan's Path Toward Inclusive Digital Governance (Click Here)
- Why Are Sexual Violence Cases Rising While Convictions Remain So Low in Pakistan? (Click Here)
- Pakistan's Rising Poverty: What Is Driving the Recent Increase in Poverty and Household Vulnerability? (Minimum Wage versus Actual Living Costs) (Click Here)
- Protecting Pakistan's Children: Why Are Children Still Vulnerable to Abuse and What Happens When They Report It? (Click Here)
- Beyond Hunger: Tackling Nutritional Deficiencies Among Pakistani Children (Click Here)
- When the Weather Becomes a Workplace Hazard: Climate Change and Labour Rights in Pakistan (Click Here)
- Battleground Algorithms: How Artificial Intelligence is Shaping Modern Conflict Narratives (Click Here)
- Reimagining Civil Society Action in Pakistan (Click Here)
- Building Digital Resilience of Civil Society (Click Here)
- Why Pakistan's Entrepreneurial Landscape Has Struggled to Deliver for Its Youth: A Critical South Asian Comparison (Click Here)
- Mental Health Access for Women: Cultural Stigma and Systemic Barriers (Click Here)
- Concrete Over Canopy: The Unmaking of Islamabad's Green Capital Dream (Click Here)
- Menstrual Health Management: Policy Gaps, Access to Hygiene Products and Cultural Taboos (Click Here)
- Climate Change and Food Security in Pakistan: A Crisis on Our Plate (Click Here)
- Environmental Health Risks: Gendered impacts of air pollution, water contamination, and climate change on women (Click Here)
- Imagination as the Blueprint of Reality (Click Here)
- Constitution for All: Rethinking Gender Inclusive Governance in Pakistan (Click Here)
- Rethinking Reforms Process in Balochistan: Innovation and Leadership at BCSA (Click Here)
- Sports as a Tool for Preventing Violent Extremism in Pakistan (Click Here)
- Groundwater Recharge: Reviving the Hidden Lifeline (Click Here)
- Selling Misinformation (Click Here)
- Data-Driven Cities: Lessons from World for Pakistan (Click Here)
- The FY 2025–26 Budget and Its Impact on Pakistan's IT & ITeS Sector (Click Here)
- Planting for Survival: Pakistan's Path Out of the Heat (Click Here)
- Transparency Through Open Data: Key to Reforming Governance in Pakistan (Click Here)
- From Reports to Reality: Why Pakistan Ranks Last in Global Gender Gap Index (Click Here)
- From Policy to People: Rethinking Governance with Design Thinking (Click Here)
- Floods, Heatwaves, and Hope: Reimagining Agriculture in a Warming Pakistan (Click Here)