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COUNTRY ANALYSIS REPORT

WORLD YOUTH SKILLS DAY

BRIDGING EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF WORK IN PAKISTAN

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Executive Summary

Pakistan enters the second half of 2026 at a moment of cautious macroeconomic stabilisation but persistent political, institutional, social, and security fragility. Across the country's governance, economy, diplomacy, human development, and climate landscape, the central challenge is not the absence of policy initiatives but the state's limited capacity to translate them into inclusive growth, effective public services, institutional credibility, and improved citizen welfare.

World Youth Skills Day 2026 highlights one of Pakistan's most consequential long-term challenges: the widening disconnect between education, skills development, and employment. Youth unemployment remains substantially higher than the national average, while more than one-quarter of young people are outside employment, education, or training. Young women face particularly severe exclusion. Pakistan's education and training systems continue to prioritise memorisation, certification, and content delivery rather than critical thinking, adaptability, ethical judgement, and workplace competence.

Politically, the country remains deeply polarised. Diplomatic engagement abroad has increased Pakistan's international visibility, but domestic instability, confrontational government-opposition relations, contested constitutional arrangements, and weak local governance continue to undermine confidence. The exclusion of a major opposition party from substantive political engagement risks further street mobilisation and declining public trust. Provincial autonomy has expanded since the 18th Constitutional Amendment, but fiscal and administrative devolution has largely failed to reach local governments, limiting improvements in service delivery and accountability. Administrative reforms, including judicial digitisation and the Islamabad Declaration on Prison Reforms, offer opportunities for progress, but their impact will depend on implementation, transparency, and credible institutional oversight.

Pakistan's economy has achieved a degree of short-term stability, yet this has not translated into a broad recovery in employment, household incomes, or poverty reduction. The trade deficit has widened, exports have underperformed, private investment remains historically weak, and foreign investment pledges have not consistently materialised into productive inflows.

Diplomatically, relations with the European Union remain sensitive to governance and human-rights concerns, while tensions surrounding the Indus Waters Treaty represent an increasingly serious threat to water, food, and energy security. Pakistan's diplomatic gains will remain limited unless they are supported by predictable regulation, stronger institutions, and improved domestic governance.

Social and humanitarian developments reveal a similar contrast between progress and vulnerability. Digital inclusion, e-governance, and women's access to mobile connectivity are expanding, but these advances coexist with attacks on healthcare facilities, preventable infection-control failures, cybersecurity threats, and deteriorating conditions in conflict-affected areas.

The security environment is becoming more geographically dispersed, with militant violence affecting Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and major urban centres. Tactical responses and clearance operations remain necessary, but they cannot replace prevention, intelligence coordination, community trust-building, civilian institutional reform, and political engagement.

Overall, Pakistan's medium-term trajectory will depend on whether limited stabilisation and diplomatic visibility can be converted into accountable governance, productive investment, inclusive opportunity, institutional legitimacy, and stronger human security. The country's most urgent requirement is a credible reform compact that connects economic recovery with political inclusion, local-level devolution, youth opportunity, social protection, security reform, and climate resilience.



World Youth Skills Day 2026

PAKISTAN MUST STOP EDUCATING YOUNG PEOPLE FOR A WORLD THAT NO LONGER EXISTS

World Youth Skills Day 2026, observed under the theme “[Skills for a Shared Future](#),” arrives at a critical moment for Pakistan. The theme recognises that skills systems must do more than prepare young people for existing vacancies: they must equip them to navigate technological disruption, economic uncertainty, climate change and increasingly complex societies. For Pakistan, however, the immediate challenge is more fundamental. The country continues to treat education, skills development, and employment as separate policy domains, even though young people experience them as a single transition- from learning to earning, participation and adulthood. The result is a system that produces degrees and certificates without consistently producing competence, confidence or viable pathways into decent work.

The latest labour-market evidence illustrates the seriousness of this disconnect. Pakistan’s Labour Force Survey 2024-25 places unemployment among people aged 15-24 at [12.8 per cent](#), compared with a national unemployment rate of 7.1 per cent. More revealingly, 28.4 per cent of young people are not in employment, education or training (NEET). The gender divide is severe: the female youth NEET rate stands at 45.4 per cent, while female youth labour-force participation is only 22.1 per cent, compared with [64.7 per cent](#) for young men. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, female youth unemployment reaches 25.6 per cent, while in Balochistan, 60.5 per cent of young women are outside education, employment, and training. These are not merely unemployment statistics. They represent lost income, delayed independence, diminished social mobility and a growing risk that Pakistan’s demographic potential will harden into prolonged exclusion.

Yet the problem cannot be solved by offering more training courses without asking what and how young people are being taught. Many Pakistani universities and training institutions still operate on a model designed for an era in which information was scarce, and lecturers were its principal custodians. Students are expected to attend, copy slides, reproduce content and pass examinations, even though artificial intelligence can now generate summaries, explanations and routine assignments within seconds. In this environment, instructional design becomes more important than content delivery. The scarce resource is no longer information; it is sustained attention, intellectual curiosity, and the capacity to distinguish knowledge from confidently presented misinformation. A university that rewards memorisation while neglecting inquiry, application and ethical judgement is solving [yesterday’s problem](#).

This requires a redefinition of what counts as a skill. Pakistan’s public debate often reduces skills to coding, freelancing or short vocational courses. These are valuable, but insufficient. The future of work will require combinations of technical, digital and human capabilities: data literacy alongside critical thinking; artificial-intelligence fluency alongside ethical reasoning; communication alongside occupational expertise; and adaptability alongside disciplinary knowledge.

UN analysis accompanying this year's observance similarly emphasises that empathy, creativity, communication, intercultural understanding and informed participation remain indispensable even as AI reshapes education and employment. Pakistan's universities and technical institutes must therefore move from syllabus coverage to learning design-using case-based teaching, simulations, apprenticeships, workplace projects, peer learning and problem-solving rooted in Pakistani realities.

AI should be treated neither as a shortcut nor as an existential threat. Used poorly, it will enable more polished plagiarism, generic assignments, and superficial learning. Used intelligently, it can help teachers develop local case studies, provide differentiated feedback, simulate workplace decisions, and identify where students are struggling. But this transition demands investment in teachers themselves. Pakistan cannot produce future-ready students through instructors who have received little training in digital pedagogy, assessment design or industry practice. Faculty development must therefore become central to higher-education reform, while assessment systems should increasingly test whether students can analyse unfamiliar problems, defend arguments, collaborate and apply knowledge-not merely recall what appeared in a lecture.

Skills policy must also be connected to actual economic demand. Training young people for occupations that do not exist at scale merely relocates unemployment from the unskilled to the certified. Institutions should be evaluated not by enrolment or certificates issued, but by graduate employment, earnings, enterprise creation, employer satisfaction, and inclusion of women, persons with disabilities, and underserved districts. Evidence from the World Bank-supported digital inclusion initiatives in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa shows the value of linking training with incubation, government demand, private-sector partnerships and income opportunities: more than **13,000 young people received training**, and nearly 6,000 subsequently reported income from online or digital-sector work. The lesson is not that every young Pakistani should become a freelancer, but that skills programmes work better when training is embedded within an ecosystem of connectivity, mentorship, market access and real work.

Pakistan also needs to resist a narrow, urban, and technology-heavy understanding of the future. Digital skills matter, but so do climate-resilient agriculture, renewable energy, healthcare, advanced manufacturing, logistics, construction, tourism, care services and local enterprise. A shared future cannot be built if young women cannot travel safely to training centres, rural learners lack internet connectivity, or graduates in Balochistan and southern Punjab are offered programmes unrelated to their regional economies. Skills planning must therefore be provincial and place-based, informed by labour-market data and designed with employers, workers, universities, technical institutions and young people themselves.

On World Youth Skills Day, Pakistan does not need another ceremonial promise that its youth are its future. It needs a new social contract in which education leads to capability, capability connects to opportunity, and opportunity is distributed more fairly. The decisive reform is not simply to teach more skills, but to redesign institutions around how young people learn, work, and live today. Pakistan's demographic dividend will not emerge automatically from the size of its youth population. It will depend on whether the country can produce a generation able to focus deeply, think independently, use technology responsibly, and convert knowledge into solutions for a rapidly changing society.

Political Updates

Pakistan's political landscape remains characterised by a sharp contrast between growing diplomatic visibility abroad and persistent institutional fragility at home. The government has presented Pakistan's reported role in facilitating dialogue between the United States and Iran as evidence of renewed international relevance and a potential catalyst for foreign investment. While diplomatic engagement may strengthen Pakistan's external standing and reduce immediate economic risks associated with regional conflict, including higher energy prices and disruption to remittance flows, it is unlikely to generate significant economic dividends in the absence of corresponding domestic reforms. Pakistan's investment climate continues to be constrained by [political uncertainty](#), inconsistent economic policies, bureaucratic hurdles, security risks, high taxation, and weak institutional predictability. The declining investment-to-GDP ratio, limited foreign direct investment, and recent withdrawal of multinational companies indicate that diplomatic prominence alone cannot compensate for underlying weaknesses in [governance](#) and economic management.

Domestically, political polarisation continues to undermine prospects for stability and inclusive governance. Relations between the federal government and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf remain confrontational, with little evidence of meaningful political dialogue. PTI continues to face organisational and electoral constraints, including restrictions surrounding its electoral symbol, the imprisonment of its founding leader, and disputes over access to legal and medical facilities. The party's support for a proposed protest [march towards Adiala Jail](#) illustrates the growing risk that political competition may again shift from parliamentary engagement to street mobilisation.



Source: Dawn

At the same time, concerns expressed within PTI about possible violence or a repetition of earlier confrontations demonstrate both internal divisions over strategy and the increasingly high perceived cost of [political protest](#). The continued exclusion of a major opposition party from substantive political engagement is likely to deepen public distrust, weaken federal cohesion, and contribute to further instability, particularly given PTI's control of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and its substantial electoral support.

The evolving debate on [provincial autonomy](#) further reflects weaknesses in Pakistan's governance architecture. The 18th Constitutional Amendment significantly expanded provincial authority and fiscal resources, but decentralisation has largely stopped at the provincial level. Local governments continue to receive a very limited proportion of public expenditure, while provincial spending remains dominated by salaries and other recurrent costs. Consequently, increased provincial allocations have not consistently translated into improved health, education, or municipal services. The amendment has also reinforced the [political dominance](#) of major parties within their provincial strongholds, allowing the PPP, PML-N, and PTI to consolidate patronage networks in Sindh, Punjab, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa respectively. This has narrowed the federal character of political parties, reduced internal political competition, and strengthened the dependence of legislators on provincial party leadership. The challenge is therefore not the principle of provincial autonomy, but the failure to extend devolution downward and establish stronger mechanisms for accountability, equitable resource distribution, and local service delivery.

Institutional developments present a similarly mixed picture. The Supreme Court's completion of the digitisation of nearly [45,000 pending case files](#) represents an important administrative reform and may improve case management, transparency, and judicial efficiency. However, technological modernisation is taking place amid continuing uncertainty regarding judicial independence, constitutional jurisdiction, and access to justice.



The return of appeals filed by former prime minister Imran Khan and Bushra Bibi on the grounds that the appropriate forum was the [Federal Constitutional Court](#) illustrates the procedural ambiguity created by recent constitutional changes. More broadly, the absence of significant institutional mobilisation in defence of constitutionalism reflects the weakening of the political and civic ecosystem that supported the 2007-2009 Lawyers' Movement. Mainstream media operates under greater constraints, bar associations are more politically fragmented, and most political parties are perceived as having accommodated prevailing power structures. Public disappointment with the judiciary's failure to deliver broad justice-sector reform after the earlier movement has also weakened confidence in lawyers and judges as vehicles of democratic change.

Recent developments further highlight the gap between elite policymaking and public priorities. The proposed extension of [official passport privileges](#) to the children of former legislators generated strong criticism because it reinforced perceptions that political institutions are more responsive to elite privileges than to declining living standards and weak public services. Conversely, the Islamabad [Declaration on Prison Reforms](#) represents a potentially important rights-based initiative. Provincial governments have acknowledged severe overcrowding, the high proportion of undertrial prisoners, inadequate healthcare and sanitation, and insufficient rehabilitation services. Commitments to expand bail, parole, probation, legal aid, and non-custodial alternatives are significant, particularly for women, children, persons with disabilities, and those detained for minor or poverty-related offences. However, the value of the declaration will depend on the adoption of measurable provincial implementation plans, adequate budgetary allocations, independent monitoring, and regular public reporting.



Source: Tribune

Overall, Pakistan's political environment remains vulnerable to recurring confrontation, institutional distrust, and fragmented governance. Diplomatic achievements and administrative reforms offer limited opportunities for improvement, but they are unlikely to produce sustained political or economic stability without progress on domestic reconciliation, constitutional governance, local-level devolution, judicial credibility, and security. The continued reliance on coercive political management, elite-centred policymaking, and external economic support risks postponing rather than resolving the country's structural challenges. Pakistan's medium-term trajectory will therefore depend less on international recognition and more on whether its political leadership can establish a credible domestic consensus around democratic inclusion, institutional reform, equitable resource distribution, and accountable governance.

Economic Updates

Pakistan's economy is showing signs of [macroeconomic stabilisation](#), but the underlying structure of the economy remains fragile. Inflationary pressure had eased compared with the crisis years, and the government continued to emphasise fiscal consolidation, revenue mobilisation and external stability, but improvements in headline indicators are not translating into a broad recovery in household welfare. Poverty rose from [21.9 per cent](#) in 2018-19 to [28.9 per cent](#) in 2024-25, while real incomes and consumption declined as cumulative inflation more than doubled the general price level over the same period. Unemployment also increased despite growth in the employed population, indicating that job creation had failed to keep pace with labour-force expansion. The central economic concern is therefore not merely whether stabilisation could be maintained, but whether it could be converted into employment, higher real incomes and meaningful social progress.



Source: Breccorder

External-sector performance reinforced these concerns. Pakistan missed its FY2025-26 export target by approximately [\\$5.2 billion](#), with exports falling to [\\$30.1 billion](#) while imports rose to nearly \$69.6 billion. The trade deficit consequently widened by more than 21 per cent to about \$39.5 billion, exposing the continuing dependence of the balance of payments on remittances, multilateral lending and debt rollovers. The decline in exports, alongside the rapid growth of imports following tariff relaxation, suggests that trade liberalisation is advancing faster than domestic productive capacity. Export subsidies and concessional finance have also remained weakly linked to measurable performance, while exporters continue to face high taxation, costly energy, an allegedly overvalued exchange rate, and frequent policy reversals. Unless incentives are redirected towards productivity, technological upgrading, and actual foreign-exchange earnings, Pakistan is likely to remain vulnerable to recurring external financing crises.

The investment environment also remained constrained despite active government efforts to attract foreign capital. High-level investment [conferences](#), diplomatic visibility and the [Special Investment Facilitation Council](#) have generated substantial pledges, but actual investment inflows remain limited. The gap reflects deeper problems, including administrative instability, high corporate taxation, judicial delays, unreliable digital infrastructure and inconsistent regulation. Domestic private investment has also fallen to historically low levels, weakening the foundation for foreign investment, which typically follows rather than substitutes for domestic confidence. Some positive initiatives were visible, including the World Bank-supported [Connected Punjab Programme](#), which seeks to expand broadband access, digital public services and cashless transactions. However, such projects will have limited economy-wide impact unless they are embedded in a broader reform agenda that improves institutional capacity, market competition and access to finance for productive firms.

The wider policy debate increasingly focuses on the failure of Pakistan's existing growth model. Critics argued that decades of donor-driven reforms, premature trade liberalisation, power-sector fragmentation and inconsistent industrial policy contributed to deindustrialisation, low productivity and declining regional competitiveness. Others emphasise that Pakistan's primary constraint is not the shortage of capital but the low return generated by public and private investment because of weak skills, limited technology adoption and rent-seeking incentives. These perspectives converge on a common conclusion: Pakistan cannot achieve durable growth through fiscal adjustment, external borrowing, or investment promotion alone. A sustainable recovery will require an indigenous and consistent economic strategy centred on export competitiveness, human capital, industrial upgrading, agricultural productivity, SME finance and stronger social protection. Without such a shift, economic stabilisation is likely to remain narrow, vulnerable and socially costly.

Diplomatic Landscape

The most tangible diplomatic success this week came from Russia's decision to lift restrictions on potato imports from Punjab following a review of Pakistan's phytosanitary control system. The move not only restores access for over [100 Pakistani exporters](#) but also demonstrates the growing importance of technical diplomacy in expanding market access. At the same time, Islamabad has intensified its economic outreach to Beijing and Riyadh. The upcoming Pakistan-China Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Investment Conference seeks to attract Chinese investment in [pharmaceuticals](#), biotechnology and healthcare manufacturing, complementing broader industrial cooperation under CPEC. Parallel discussions in Riyadh focused on [Saudi investment](#) in Pakistan's electricity transmission network, smart metering infrastructure and digitalisation of the power sector. Rather than relying solely on financial assistance, Pakistan is increasingly courting foreign partners for technology transfer, industrial modernisation and long-term productive investment.

Pakistan's engagement with the European Union also remained under scrutiny following a non-binding resolution adopted by the European Parliament expressing concerns over the rights of religious minorities and warning that continued human rights violations could affect Pakistan's [GSP+ trade preferences](#). While the resolution attracted considerable attention, it carries no legal authority over the GSP+ scheme, which is administered by the European Commission. The development, nevertheless, serves as a reminder that human rights performance remains an important component of Pakistan-EU relations. Although the Commission is expected to continue its policy of dialogue and conditional engagement rather than sanctions, the resolution reinforces the need for Pakistan to address governance and rights concerns proactively to safeguard its largest export market and maintain the positive momentum in bilateral relations.



Pakistan's diplomatic engagement has also extended into humanitarian and multilateral spheres. Customs authorities facilitated the movement of [World Food Programme containers](#) carrying food and essential supplies to Afghanistan through the Torkham border, despite the route remaining largely closed because of security tensions. The episode illustrates Pakistan's continuing role as a logistical corridor for humanitarian assistance, although the uncertainty surrounding acceptance of the supplies by the Afghan authorities highlights the difficulties of humanitarian diplomacy under strained bilateral relations.

Security cooperation, meanwhile, continues to underpin Pakistan's relationship with Washington despite periodic political differences. The United States recently reaffirmed Pakistan's [right to defend](#) itself against terrorism following cross-border security operations, while Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi's visit to [FBI headquarters](#) produced discussions on specialised training in counterterrorism financing and cyber investigations. These developments illustrate the resilience of functional security cooperation even as broader strategic priorities between the two countries evolve. Simultaneously, Pakistan has sought to strengthen its multilateral profile by assuming the chairmanship of the [9th OIC Ministerial Conference on Women](#), using the platform to project itself as an advocate of women's education, entrepreneurship, digital inclusion, and legal empowerment. Although translating these commitments into measurable domestic reforms remains an enduring challenge, the chairmanship enhances Pakistan's diplomatic visibility across the Islamic world.



Source: Oic.org

An equally important diplomatic challenge concerns the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan views India's decision to [hold the treaty in abeyance](#), suspend hydrological data sharing and accelerate upstream infrastructure development as a direct threat to its water, food and energy security. The issue is no longer confined to individual dams or technical disputes; it concerns the cumulative ability to alter the timing and predictability of river flows, particularly on the Chenab. Pakistan's response is therefore likely to combine diplomacy, international legal action and accelerated investment in domestic water storage, irrigation efficiency, telemetry and hydrological forecasting. The treaty has historically served as an important stabilising mechanism between India and Pakistan, and its weakening risks transforming water governance into another source of strategic confrontation in South Asia.

The challenge ahead will be converting diplomatic goodwill into sustained economic gains through institutional reforms, improved governance and policy continuity. Without corresponding domestic improvements, diplomatic achievements may remain symbolic rather than transformative, limiting Pakistan's ability to translate international engagement into long-term economic resilience and geopolitical influence.

Social and Humanitarian Updates

Pakistan's recent social and humanitarian developments present a picture of striking contrasts. On one hand, the country is reporting measurable progress in digital inclusion, public service delivery and women's participation in the digital economy. On the other, persistent insecurity, attacks on healthcare, humanitarian access challenges and deepening conflict in Balochistan continue to expose structural governance weaknesses. Rather than existing as separate issues, these developments are closely interconnected, revealing that Pakistan's greatest development challenge is no longer the absence of policy ambition but the uneven capacity of state institutions to translate reforms into security, equity and public trust. The country's social trajectory therefore remains defined by simultaneous progress and fragility.

One of the most encouraging developments is the government's increasing emphasis on digital inclusion and administrative modernisation. At the 9th OIC Ministerial Conference on Women, Pakistan announced that the mobile internet gender gap had narrowed dramatically- from **38 per cent in 2024 to just 8 per cent in 2026**, supported by the distribution of **ten million free mobile connections** to women and the rapid expansion of digital financial inclusion. If independently validated, this would represent one of the fastest improvements in women's digital connectivity among developing economies, with important implications for financial inclusion, entrepreneurship and access to public services.



Source: Moitt

Complementing these efforts, Balochistan launched an integrated **e-domicile** and **e-local certificate system** through NADRA, replacing cumbersome manual procedures with a province-wide digital platform designed to reduce fraud, eliminate middlemen and improve administrative transparency. These initiatives reflect an emerging governance model that increasingly relies on digital infrastructure to improve citizen-state interaction. However, sustaining these gains will require parallel investments in digital literacy, cybersecurity, rural connectivity and institutional capacity to ensure that technological expansion does not reinforce existing inequalities.

Yet these governance advances are unfolding against a deteriorating humanitarian and security environment. A new report by **Safeguarding Health in Conflict** documented a worrying shift in violence against healthcare during 2025, with attacks increasingly targeting health facilities themselves rather than solely polio vaccination campaigns. Damage to hospitals and clinics, continued kidnappings of health workers, and the use of improvised explosive devices against medical infrastructure, particularly in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, underscore the growing vulnerability of civilian services within conflict-affected regions.

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The reported HIV outbreak among more than [100 children](#) in Karachi adds an even more disturbing dimension to Pakistan's healthcare crisis because it appears to have arisen not from an unavoidable disease burden, but from preventable failures in infection control and regulatory enforcement. Preliminary accounts have pointed to the possible reuse of disposable syringes, inadequate screening of blood for HIV and other transmissible infections, and weak oversight of hospitals, clinics and blood banks. The case echoes earlier outbreaks in Ratodero and Taunsa, suggesting that unsafe injection practices are not isolated lapses but symptoms of a wider governance failure in which legislation exists without effective implementation. The consequences are particularly grave for children, who may require lifelong treatment because basic patient-safety protocols were ignored. A credible response must therefore go beyond emergency testing and treatment to include an independent investigation into the source of infection, mandatory use of auto-disable syringes, routine infection-control audits, stricter regulation of blood transfusion services, prosecution of those responsible for illegal syringe reuse, and transparent public reporting. Any attempt to suppress information or focus on how the outbreak reached the media would further erode trust and allow a preventable public health emergency to deepen.

Simultaneously, Pakistan's [National Computer Emergency Response Team \(CERT\)](#) issued an urgent nationwide cybersecurity advisory following a massive global compromise of Fortinet firewall systems affecting nearly 74,000 internet-facing devices across 194 countries. The warning, directed at government institutions, banks, telecommunications providers, healthcare facilities and critical infrastructure operators, reflects another emerging humanitarian dimension: the security of digital public services. As governance, healthcare and financial systems become increasingly digitised, cybersecurity has become inseparable from national resilience and public welfare.

The humanitarian crisis in Balochistan remains perhaps the country's most pressing governance challenge. The [recent attacks in Quetta, Ziarat, and Lasbela](#) have once again highlighted the widening disconnect between military responses and long-term political solutions. While authorities continue to emphasise counterterrorism operations, independent analyses increasingly point towards deep-rooted political alienation, weak civilian governance and declining public confidence as underlying drivers of instability. Reports of rising attacks, allegations of inadequate protection for police personnel, [growing public frustration](#), and persistent perceptions of state neglect indicate that security operations alone are unlikely to restore lasting stability. Collectively, these developments suggest that Pakistan's long-term stability will depend less on isolated policy successes than on its ability to simultaneously strengthen governance, protect essential public services, rebuild trust in conflict-affected regions and ensure that economic and technological progress is matched by equally meaningful advances in human security and institutional accountability.

Security Updates

Pakistan's security environment is becoming more geographically dispersed and operationally complex. The Ziarat ambush, in which nine police personnel were killed before security forces neutralised [15 suspected TTP militants](#), illustrates both the continuing lethality of armed groups and the growing exposure of provincial police forces operating in difficult terrain. Recent violence in Balochistan, alongside alleged militant activity and arrests in Karachi, suggests that the threat is no longer confined to [traditional conflict zones](#). Of particular concern is the possibility of tactical coordination, logistical overlap or parallel targeting by the TTP and Baloch separatist groups, which could stretch intelligence and law-enforcement capacities across multiple provinces.



Source: Reuters

The state's ability to conduct successful clearance operations remains important, but retaliatory action after attacks cannot substitute for prevention. A more effective response requires stronger coordination among police, counterterrorism departments, intelligence agencies and the military, alongside investment in human intelligence, forensic investigation and early-warning systems. Public protests following the [Ziarat violence](#) also show that security is inseparable from trust: communities require credible explanations, protection and accountability, not only assurances of forceful retaliation. Pakistan must also sustain diplomatic pressure on Afghanistan over militant sanctuaries, while recognising that lasting stability in Balochistan will require political engagement, stronger civilian institutions and improved local governance in addition to kinetic operations.

Environment and Climate Change Related Updates

Recent monsoon flooding, [deadly roof collapses](#), and intensifying heat stress illustrate how climate change is increasingly translating into immediate human and economic losses across Pakistan. Flash floods triggered by hill torrents inundated villages in [Dera Ghazi Khan](#), affecting hundreds of residents, while heavy rainfall in Kohat caused a house collapse that killed ten people. Such incidents reveal that climate vulnerability is shaped not only by extreme weather but also by poverty, fragile housing, inadequate drainage, weak land-use planning and limited early-warning coverage. The fact that house collapses account for a substantial share of monsoon deaths shows that climate disasters are magnifying existing development failures rather than operating as isolated natural events.

The effects are also extending beyond human settlements into agriculture and biodiversity. Pakistan's [mango exports](#) have declined as heatwaves, erratic rainfall, windstorms and pest outbreaks reduce yields and fruit quality, while the closure of regional trade routes has compounded losses for growers. In Islamabad, wildlife rescuers are increasingly treating birds suffering from [dehydration and heatstroke](#), indicating that extreme temperatures are disrupting habitats, food sources and breeding cycles. These developments demonstrate that climate change is simultaneously threatening rural livelihoods, export earnings, food systems and ecological stability, with smaller farmers and vulnerable communities bearing the greatest costs.



Source: Asharq Awasat

Despite these escalating risks, the federal budget signals a troubling retreat from preventive climate action. Allocations for mitigation and adaptation have declined sharply, even as funding for disaster response and reconstruction has increased. This reflects a reactive model in which the state spends after losses occur rather than investing adequately in [resilient infrastructure](#), heat adaptation, climate-smart agriculture and ecosystem protection. New climate-related levies may raise revenue, but without transparent ring-fencing and public reporting, they risk becoming general fiscal instruments rather than genuine climate-finance mechanisms. Pakistan's challenge is therefore not simply to secure more international funding, but to fundamentally integrate climate resilience into budgeting, urban planning, agriculture, public health and provincial development policy.

Reading Recommendations

- Battleground Algorithms: How Artificial Intelligence is Shaping Modern Conflict Narratives ([Click Here](#))
- Reimagining Civil Society Action in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- Building Digital Resilience of Civil Society ([Click Here](#))
- Why Pakistan's Entrepreneurial Landscape Has Struggled to Deliver for Its Youth: A Critical South Asian Comparison ([Click Here](#))
- Mental Health Access for Women: Cultural Stigma and Systemic Barriers ([Click Here](#))
- Concrete Over Canopy: The Unmaking of Islamabad's Green Capital Dream ([Click Here](#))
- Menstrual Health Management: Policy Gaps, Access to Hygiene Products and Cultural Taboos ([Click Here](#))
- Climate Change and Food Security in Pakistan: A Crisis on Our Plate ([Click Here](#))
- Environmental Health Risks: Gendered impacts of air pollution, water contamination, and climate change on women ([Click Here](#))
- Imagination as the Blueprint of Reality ([Click Here](#))
- Constitution for All: Rethinking Gender Inclusive Governance in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- Rethinking Reforms Process in Balochistan: Innovation and Leadership at BCSA ([Click Here](#))
- Sports as a Tool for Preventing Violent Extremism in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- Groundwater Recharge: Reviving the Hidden Lifeline ([Click Here](#))
- Selling Misinformation ([Click Here](#))
- Data-Driven Cities: Lessons from World for Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- The FY 2025–26 Budget and Its Impact on Pakistan's IT & ITeS Sector ([Click Here](#))
- Planting for Survival: Pakistan's Path Out of the Heat ([Click Here](#))
- Transparency Through Open Data: Key to Reforming Governance in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- From Reports to Reality: Why Pakistan Ranks Last in Global Gender Gap Index ([Click Here](#))
- From Policy to People: Rethinking Governance with Design Thinking ([Click Here](#))
- Floods, Heatwaves, and Hope: Reimagining Agriculture in a Warming Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- The Fight for Transparent Access to Information in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- Life without Autonomy: Understanding Our Culture of Dependency ([Click Here](#))
- Prioritizing Citizens Beyond the Ballot ([Click Here](#))
- Solving the corruption challenge: The key may lie with the citizens. ([Click Here](#))
- Citizens' Inclusion and Accountability is the Key to Improved Governance and Efficient Public Sector Institutions ([Click Here](#))
- Digital Community Policing ([Click Here](#))
- Privatization of Schools in Punjab ([Click Here](#))
- Water Governance Challenges in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- Consumer Protection in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))