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

COUNTRY ANALYSIS REPORT

PAKISTAN'S PROVINCIAL BUDGETS

STABILISATION AT WHAT COST?

June 15th - 30th, 2026

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Executive Summary

Pakistan's July 2026 Country Analysis Report presents a clear picture of a state managing stability without yet resolving the structural contradictions that continue to weaken governance, fiscal federalism, economic resilience, climate preparedness, and regional diplomacy. The central argument running through the report is that Pakistan has entered FY2026–27 with improved macroeconomic indicators and a more disciplined fiscal framework, but this stability is heavily controlled, politically negotiated, and developmentally fragile.

The most significant domestic policy development is the provincial budget cycle, which reveals the limits of Pakistan's current fiscal settlement. Provincial budgets are not simply local planning documents; they are part of a wider federal effort to meet IMF-linked fiscal targets, accommodate rising defence needs, and preserve debt sustainability. The National Economic Council's decision to reduce the national development plan and secure provincial contributions to the Centre shows that development spending has once again become the main adjustment variable.

Economically, Pakistan enters FY2026–27 with signs of recovery but not yet transformation. GDP growth of 3.7 percent, stronger remittances, ICT exports, and improved external stability provide some basis for cautious optimism. However, investment remains weak, savings are low, poverty remains high, and the economy remains dependent on external financing and IMF-backed stabilisation.

Climate change emerges as an urgent economic and governance challenge rather than a peripheral environmental concern. Pakistan's severe water stress, dependence on the Indus Basin, climate-related agricultural losses, floods, droughts, heatwaves, and weak implementation capacity make adaptation a national security and development priority. Recent initiatives such as the Anticipatory Action Strategy and Climate Sangat portal are positive, but they will have limited impact unless linked to local implementation, financing triggers, enforceable standards, heat action plans, flood-resilient infrastructure, and accountable monitoring. The climate budget's heavy concentration on the Green Pakistan Programme shows that Pakistan still risks prioritising visible plantation activity over broader resilience systems.

Diplomatically, Pakistan is navigating a volatile regional environment. The Indus Waters Treaty dispute with India remains central, with Pakistan framing New Delhi's unilateral abeyance position as legally invalid and a threat to national survival. Relations with Afghanistan continue to deteriorate around cross-border militancy, while Pakistan's engagement with ASEAN, the UN, the Gulf, China, and Middle Eastern diplomacy reflects an attempt to broaden its strategic profile. However, the report's overarching conclusion is that external diplomacy cannot compensate for domestic fragility. Pakistan's credibility and leverage abroad will ultimately depend on whether it can tax privilege, spend efficiently, protect rights, strengthen institutions, and convert fiscal stability into public value.

Pakistan's Provincial Budgets

Stabilisation at What Cost?

Pakistan's provincial budgets for FY2026-27 should not be read as four separate accounting exercises. They are better understood as the provincial face of Pakistan's larger fiscal settlement: a state trying to maintain macroeconomic stability under an IMF programme, rising defence needs, shrinking development space, and an unresolved constitutional argument over who should pay for the federation's fiscal failures. The result is not a growth-oriented budget cycle. It is a cycle of controlled stability.

The most important fact is not that the provinces presented large budgets. It is that their fiscal space had already been politically negotiated before those budgets reached the assemblies. The National Economic Council approved a Rs3.2 trillion national development plan, about 25 per cent lower than originally proposed, after three provinces agreed to freeze development spending and provide Rs920 billion as grants to the Centre. Provincial Annual Development Plans were reduced to Rs2.218 trillion, while the federal (Public Sector Development Program) PSDP was trimmed to Rs1 trillion. This means that the provincial budgets were shaped less by provincial planning priorities and more by Islamabad's need to meet debt, defence and IMF-linked fiscal targets.

The table below compares the FY2026-27 provincial budgets by overall outlay, development allocation, and fiscal posture. It also clarifies an important distinction: while the federal fiscal framework expects provinces to contribute to the national surplus position, provincial budgets do not present a uniform fiscal stance.

Province	Budget Size/Outlay	Development Allocation	Fiscal Posture
Punjab	Rs5.903tr	Rs752bn ADP, revised downward after the NEC cut	Projected Rs910bn surplus; includes a Rs546bn grant/contribution to the federal government, up to 25% increase in property tax, higher agricultural income tax, Abiana/water charges, token tax, and up to threefold increase in tax on commercial loader vehicles.
Sindh	Rs3.562tr	Development portfolio reduced; major allocations retained for Karachi, transport, health, and education	Rs36.9bn deficit; no new taxes; province agreed to a Rs260bn contribution toward national strategic requirements.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Around Rs2.17tr	Around Rs524bn	Projected deficit; government says it will not borrow to bridge the gap and will not provide grants to the Centre.
Balochistan	Rs1.13tr receipts; Rs1.09tr expenditure	Rs291.55bn overall development allocation	Rs45.57bn surplus; no new taxes.

The provinces entered this budget season with an apparently strong fiscal record. According to the Economic Survey, all four provinces collectively posted a record Rs1,636.1 billion surplus in July-March, compared with Rs1 trillion last year, while provincial revenue grew by 12.9 per cent. But this surplus is politically misleading. It does not necessarily reflect stronger provincial economies or superior public finance management. It partly reflects compression of development spending, delayed execution, reliance on federal transfers, and the provinces' role in helping Islamabad show a better consolidated fiscal balance.

This is where the Centre's argument has some force but limited credibility. Islamabad is correct that provinces must share fiscal responsibility. Health, education, agriculture, local infrastructure, property taxation, sales tax on services, and parts of social protection are provincial domains after the 18th Amendment. Yet the Centre's demand that provinces contribute funds for national needs comes after years of federal inability to broaden the tax base. The federal government raised defence spending by 18 per cent to Rs3 trillion, kept development limited, and set a steep tax target under the IMF framework. Reuters reported that the federal budget shows how little room Pakistan has left as debt payments, defence and IMF targets take priority over development and welfare expansion.

The problem, therefore, is not simply Centre versus provinces. It is a deeper failure of Pakistan's fiscal bargain. The Centre complains that the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award leaves it short of resources, but it has also expanded non-divisible revenue instruments such as the petroleum levy, which are not shared with provinces. The provinces defend constitutional autonomy, but they have not seriously taxed agriculture, high-value property, retail networks, or services at their real potential. Both sides invoke principle when convenient and avoid reform when it threatens powerful constituencies

.The 7th NFC Award and the 18th Amendment were not merely accounting reforms. They were intended to create a more balanced federation by transferring both resources and responsibilities to the provinces. But the bargain was incomplete. The provinces received greater shares from the divisible pool, while the political economy of provincial taxation remained largely untouched. Agriculture remains undertaxed, urban real estate remains a storehouse of untaxed wealth, and provincial sales tax on services has not been used to document large parts of the economy. Provincial dependence on NFC transfers remains structural: around three-quarters of spending in Punjab and KP, over three-fifths in Sindh, and the vast majority in Balochistan is still federally financed.

This creates the central contradiction of the provincial budgets: they are politically relief-oriented but fiscally conservative. All four provinces avoided major new taxes. Salaries and pensions were increased. Minimum wages were raised, including Sindh's increase to Rs43,000. Sindh's Rs3.562 trillion budget included no new taxes, a 7 per cent increase in salaries and pensions, a Rs36.9 billion deficit, and a stated Rs260 billion contribution for national strategic needs. These decisions make political sense after several years of inflation. But they also lock provinces into a low-reform, high-current-expenditure model.

Punjab illustrates the most consequential trade-off. With the country's largest population, strongest tax base and largest provincial economy, Punjab should be the province most capable of designing a productivity-oriented budget. Instead, its development allocation was cut sharply from earlier ambitions, while education, health, salaries, and pensions were protected. This may be defensible in a difficult year, but it also shows that Pakistan's most fiscally capable province is still unwilling to move decisively on agriculture income, property valuation, local taxation and urban service financing. Punjab's budget is cautious. But its caution carries a national cost because Punjab's fiscal choices shape the federation's overall growth potential.

Sindh's budget is more politically explicit. It protects welfare language, public-sector compensation, health, education, transport, and local government delivery, while resisting the perception that provincial autonomy can be diluted through fiscal pressure. Its no-new-tax posture sits uneasily with its own development needs, especially in Karachi, flood-affected districts, irrigation, sanitation, and local government. Sindh's budget is therefore best read as a political balancing act: defend the NFC share, preserve PPP's social protection narrative, absorb a federal contribution, and avoid alienating taxpayers or public employees in the same year.

KP's budget is constrained by a different mix of pressures: security, merged districts, weak own-source revenue, wage commitments and dependence on federal transfers, including war-on-terror related flows. A province facing militancy, border pressures, and post-merger development obligations cannot be assessed through the same fiscal lens as Punjab or Sindh. Yet KP also suffers from the same structural problem: too little of it's own revenue and too much reliance on transfers. Without credible fiscal decentralisation within the province, stronger local governments, better property taxation, and targeted development execution, its deficit will remain more structural than temporary.

Balochistan presents the clearest example of budgetary appearance versus fiscal reality. On paper, it has presented another surplus budget. Dawn reported Rs1.13 trillion in budget receipts, Rs1.09 trillion in expenditure, and a Rs45.57 billion surplus, but also noted that federal transfers remain the mainstay of provincial finances and that development spending has been cut to Rs291.55 billion. This is not fiscal strength in the conventional sense. It is transfer-dependent solvency. Balochistan's real test is not whether it can show a surplus, but whether it can convert federal receipts into functioning schools, operational basic health units, water systems, roads, climate resilience and economic opportunity in a province where underdevelopment is inseparable from political alienation.

The most worrying pattern across all four budgets is that:

Development spending has become the adjustment variable

When the federation needs fiscal space, development is cut first. When wages rise, development is squeezed. When defence needs increase, development is deferred. When IMF primary surplus targets tighten, development becomes expendable. This approach may help Pakistan meet short-term fiscal benchmarks, but it weakens the very foundations of future growth: human capital, local infrastructure, water security, urban productivity and climate adaptation.

There is also a democratic problem. Provincial budgets are supposed to reflect provincial mandates. Yet this year, the most important provincial fiscal decision was effectively made through federal-provincial bargaining before the assembly debates. That may be legally manageable as a one-year grant arrangement, but if it becomes a recurring practice, it will weaken the spirit of fiscal federalism. A federation cannot function if provincial autonomy is respected only when the Centre has enough money.
Still, the provinces cannot hide behind constitutionalism forever. Provincial autonomy is not a shield for elite tax exemptions. The stronger critique of the provinces is that they have accepted the benefits of devolution without fully accepting the revenue responsibilities that come with it. Agriculture, prime urban real estate, and wholesale-retail trade remain the real untaxed spaces, while the compliant salaried and formal sectors continue to carry the burden.

The way forward is not to undo the NFC Award, nor to centralise Pakistan's fiscal system again. That would be politically destabilising and constitutionally regressive. The better path is a performance-linked federal compact. The next NFC discussion should retain the principle of provincial entitlement but introduce stronger incentives for own-source revenue mobilisation, development execution, climate resilience, education outcomes, health delivery and local government empowerment. Population cannot remain the dominant fiscal criterion without stronger links to performance, poverty, backwardness, revenue effort, and service delivery.

Pakistan's FY2026-27 provincial budgets therefore reveal a federation buying time.

The fiscal and economic managers of Pakistan have avoid new tax shocks. They preserve social-sector language. But they do not resolve the fiscal contradiction at the heart of the state. The Centre wants provincial money because it cannot tax enough. The provinces want autonomy without taxing their own elites enough. Citizens want services from governments whose budgets are increasingly consumed by wages, transfers, debt, security, and delayed reforms.

Pakistan's provincial budgets will only become meaningful development instruments when fiscal federalism moves beyond the annual argument over who gives money to whom and begins asking the harder question: which level of government is willing to tax privilege, spend efficiently, and deliver measurable public value?

Political Updates

June 2026 was dominated by the federal budget process, but the politics around the Finance Bill showed that the issue was not only fiscal management; it was also about the government's preferred model of governance. The Finance Bill for FY2026-27, carrying a Rs 18.8 trillion budget, was passed by the National Assembly after an opposition walkout and later received presidential assent. The Standing Committee on Finance introduced around 30 amendments, including digital production monitoring, tax stamps and barcodes, faceless assessments, mobile phone tax instalments through Pakistan Telecom Authority (PTA) systems, and an SBP-linked banking data repository for tax purposes. These measures indicate a clear shift toward documentation, surveillance-based tax compliance, and automated enforcement. While this may strengthen revenue collection and reduce discretion in some areas, it also raises concerns about privacy safeguards, institutional capacity, and whether Pakistan is building a compliance regime faster than it is building public trust in the tax system.

The most politically sensitive development of the month was the unrest in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The AJK government proscribed the Joint Awami Action Committee ahead of its June 9 protest call, while the movement's core demand centred on the abolition of 12 reserved refugee seats in the AJK Legislative Assembly. The protests escalated into one of the deadliest episodes of unrest in the region in years, with Reuters reporting at least 24 deaths, hundreds of detentions, road closures, internet restrictions, and serious disruption to daily life. The subsequent blocking of Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Ayeen-e-Pakistan (TTAP) opposition delegation from travelling to AJK further turned the issue from a regional governance dispute into a national question of political freedoms. The deeper concern is that the state appears to be treating a representational grievance largely as a security problem. With AJK elections scheduled for July 27, this approach risks weakening electoral legitimacy and undermining Pakistan's own democratic messaging on Kashmir.

Source: Reuters

June also reflected a tightening institutional and civic space. The Judicial Commission of Pakistan approved rules for interviews in judicial appointments and criteria for constitutional benches, while deferring rules for performance evaluation of high court judges.

On paper, structured interviews may improve transparency, but in the current political environment, they will also be judged against wider concerns about executive influence and judicial independence. Separately, the Federal Shariat Court's restoration of Section 325 Pakistan Penal Code, recriminalising attempted suicide, became part of a wider debate on whether the state is leaning too heavily on punishment where social protection and mental health responses are required. In Punjab, the proposed Control of Habitual Offenders and Anti-Social Behaviour Bill raised serious rights concerns because of the extensive executive powers proposed, including bank accounts freezing, identity blocking, electronic monitoring, and removal of digital presence. The reported life sentence against rights activist Mahrang Baloch further reinforced concerns that dissent, especially from peripheral regions, is increasingly being processed through securitised and punitive frameworks.

Governance and accountability tensions were also visible in the dispute over Pakistan Railways. The Auditor General's findings flagged significant issues across public-sector entities, including unrealised tax potential, unaudited accounts in parts of the energy sector, revenue leakages, and a qualified audit opinion for Pakistan Railways. The Railways Minister rejected the AGP's reported assessment and claimed that the department had achieved a Rs 115 billion revenue target, while also highlighting outsourcing, right-sizing, digitalisation, and planned upgrades. Politically, this reflects a broader pattern: the executive wants to frame reform through performance claims and service-delivery announcements, while constitutional accountability bodies continue to highlight weak controls, losses, and unresolved audit issues. The overall picture for June is therefore one of a state pursuing fiscal discipline, administrative control, and institutional consolidation, but often through approaches that risk narrowing democratic debate, weakening civic confidence, and deepening tensions in already fragile regions.

Economic Updates

Pakistan enters FY2026-27 with a mixed economic outlook: macroeconomic indicators show recovery, but the foundations of that recovery remain fragile. The Economic Survey 2025-26 reported GDP growth of 3.7pc, the strongest in four years, supported by large-scale manufacturing, construction, ICT exports, remittances and some improvement in external stability. The federal budget has been framed as growth-centric, with the government targeting export-led expansion, formalisation of the economy, digital tax enforcement, IT sector incentives, electric vehicle concessions, and support for selected industrial sectors. Yet this optimism must be treated cautiously. Growth remains below the official target, investment remains weak, national savings remain low, poverty remains elevated, and the economy continues to depend heavily on remittances, external financing, and IMF-backed stabilisation. In other words, Pakistan has not yet achieved a credible shift toward sustained, productivity-driven growth.

As briefly discussed earlier, the Finance Bill 2026-27 reveals the government's central economic strategy: increase documentation, widen the tax net and use digital systems to reduce leakages. Measures such as tax stamps, barcodes, digital production monitoring, faceless assessments, mobile phone tax instalments through PTA systems, and an SBP-based banking data repository suggest a move toward stronger enforcement and administrative control. The proposed 5pc withholding tax on social media income also reflects an attempt to bring the creator economy into the formal tax system, with survey findings showing public support for taxing influencers but also concern that smaller digital creators should not be discouraged.

The outlook is particularly vulnerable in agriculture, textiles and external accounts. Punjab's cotton cultivation has missed its target by 18pc, with acreage falling sharply due to adverse weather, competing crop incentives and the spread of sugar mills in cotton-growing regions. This has serious implications for textile exports, rural incomes, cottonseed availability, and edible oil imports. At the same time, the textile sector continues to face high electricity tariffs, heavy taxation, expensive borrowing and refund delays, while industry representatives warn of a contraction in active textile mills. These pressures undermine the very export base on which the government's growth strategy depends.

External risks are also rising: Gulf instability has affected market sentiment, foreign direct investment has declined, domestic bonds have seen outflows, and Pakistan's dependence on remittances and friendly financing keeps the external account exposed. Pakistan may seek economic openings through regional diplomacy and CPEC 2.0, but foreign investors are unlikely to respond strongly unless domestic policy becomes predictable, commercially viable and politically stable.

The deeper weakness in Pakistan's economic outlook is that stabilisation has not been matched by structural reform. Several commentators rightly point out that Pakistan remains trapped in a low-growth equilibrium shaped by high interest rates, contractionary taxation, weak human capital, poor climate preparedness, and inconsistent policy direction. The Economic Survey's limited treatment of climate change is especially concerning given floods, El Niño risks, agricultural stress and Pakistan's long-term exposure to extreme weather.

Medium and Small-Medium Enterprises are repeatedly described as the backbone of the economy, but they still face limited access to affordable finance, weak technology adoption and a difficult regulatory environment. More broadly, Pakistan's development challenge is rooted in underinvestment in people: low literacy, gender gaps, weak public health and education spending, youth unemployment, brain drain and regional inequality continue to limit the country's productive potential. Without serious investment in human capital, women's economic participation, climate-resilient agriculture, export competitiveness and institutional trust, FY2026-27 may deliver another year of managed stability, but not the inclusive economic transformation Pakistan urgently needs.

Diplomatic Landscape

Pakistan's diplomatic landscape in June 2026 was shaped by a combination of legal contestation, regional security pressures and efforts to project itself as a responsible international actor. The most consequential front remained the Indus Waters Treaty dispute with India. Islamabad has strongly rejected New Delhi's unilateral decision to place the treaty "in abeyance," arguing that the 1960 World Bank-brokered framework remains legally enforceable and cannot be revoked, amended or suspended by one party alone. Pakistan's emphasis on the treaty as a rights-based and international law issue reflects a deliberate attempt to move the matter beyond bilateral hostility and into the domain of global legal norms. However, the dispute also exposes Pakistan's deep vulnerability: water is not only a diplomatic issue but a national security, food security and economic survival question, especially when agriculture supports a large share of employment and GDP.

Relations with Afghanistan again showed the limits of regional diplomacy when Pakistan issued a strong démarche to Kabul after the Karachi attack on a Rangers facility. Islamabad's position that Afghan soil and Afghan nationals continue to be used in attacks inside Pakistan has hardened over time, and the reported strikes on militant hideouts in Paktia, Paktika and Kunar indicate that Pakistan is increasingly willing to pair diplomatic protest with direct security action. This creates a dangerous cycle: Pakistan demands that Kabul act against militant sanctuaries, while the Afghan Taliban either denies responsibility or lacks the capacity and willingness to restrain these groups. As a result, the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship is becoming less a conventional diplomatic relationship and more a security-management crisis with recurring military and humanitarian risks.

At the multilateral level, Pakistan sought to broaden its diplomatic profile. Its engagement with ASEAN through the 9th ASEAN-Pakistan Joint Sectoral Cooperation Committee highlighted cooperation in trade, investment, cybersecurity, food security, climate change, disaster management, smart agriculture and people-to-people exchanges. This is important because Pakistan needs to diversify its diplomatic and economic partnerships beyond its traditional reliance on China, the Gulf and Western financial institutions. At the United Nations, Pakistan also maintained its long-standing position on Palestine, criticising Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank and calling for stronger Security Council action. The credibility of this posture depends on whether Pakistan can also demonstrate internal political stability, rule-based governance and consistent respect for rights at home.

Source: Reuters

The wider strategic picture shows Pakistan trying to operate as a middle power in a highly volatile region. Its role in US-Iran de-escalation efforts, continued engagement with Saudi Arabia, and participation in Gulf security discussions reflect Islamabad's attempt to remain relevant in Middle Eastern diplomacy while protecting remittances, energy routes and strategic partnerships. At the same time, Pakistan's deepening relationship with China is moving beyond traditional defence and infrastructure cooperation into more technologically integrated domains, including space, satellite systems, navigation and multi-domain security cooperation. The challenge is that diplomatic activism abroad cannot compensate for domestic fragility; Pakistan's external leverage will ultimately depend on whether it can strengthen economic resilience, institutional credibility and regional stability at home.

Environment and Climate Change-Related Updates

Pakistan's climate crisis is no longer a future risk. The country's ranking as the 14th most water-stressed in the world is especially alarming because agriculture remains deeply dependent on the Indus Basin irrigation system, while renewable freshwater availability has fallen below the severe scarcity threshold. With agriculture contributing nearly a quarter of GDP and employing over one-third of the workforce, water stress is not merely an environmental issue; it is an economic and food security threat. Climate change has intensified floods, heatwaves, droughts, erratic monsoons and pest attacks, but the deeper problem lies in weak governance, poor implementation of existing policies, inefficient irrigation, overuse of chemical inputs, monocropping and the continued failure to modernise farming systems.

Source: Getty

Recent climate initiatives show that Pakistan is only just beginning to recognise the scale of the challenge, but the response remains uneven. The launch of the Anticipatory Action Strategy is a positive shift from post-disaster relief to pre-disaster preparedness, particularly because early warnings, cash assistance and forecast-based action can reduce losses before floods or heatwaves strike. Similarly, the Climate Sangat portal can help strengthen climate communication by improving access to reliable information, research, local solutions and expert networks. However, information-sharing and early warning systems will only matter if they are connected to enforceable standards, local government capacity, financial triggers and community-level implementation. Adaptation cannot remain a slogan or a donor-facing framework; it requires measurable systems, clear thresholds, heat action plans, flood-resistant infrastructure, drought-responsive agriculture, and accountable institutions that act before disaster becomes a humanitarian tragedy.

The federal climate budget exposes the gap between climate rhetoric and climate priorities. The Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination has been allocated Rs2.478 billion under the PSDP, with more than 94pc directed toward the Green Pakistan Programme. While afforestation is important, the overemphasis on plantation drives risks becoming symbolic if mature forests continue to be destroyed, sapling survival is not independently audited, and adaptation infrastructure remains underfunded. Pakistan's climate challenge requires a shift from activity-based spending to outcome-based resilience: protecting forests, restoring degraded land, modernising irrigation, strengthening municipal drainage, expanding climate-smart agricultural advisory services, and creating financing mechanisms that reach farmers before shocks occur. The country does not lack climate policies; it lacks implementation discipline, transparent monitoring and the political will to treat climate adaptation as a core economic policy rather than a peripheral environmental concern.

Reading Recommendations

- Battleground Algorithms: How Artificial Intelligence is Shaping Modern Conflict Narratives (Click Here)
- Reimagining Civil Society Action in Pakistan (Click Here)
- Building Digital Resilience of Civil Society (Click Here)
- Why Pakistan's Entrepreneurial Landscape Has Struggled to Deliver for Its Youth: A Critical South Asian Comparison (Click Here)
- Mental Health Access for Women: Cultural Stigma and Systemic Barriers (Click Here)
- Concrete Over Canopy: The Unmaking of Islamabad's Green Capital Dream (Click Here)
- Menstrual Health Management: Policy Gaps, Access to Hygiene Products and Cultural Taboos (Click Here)
- Climate Change and Food Security in Pakistan: A Crisis on Our Plate (Click Here)
- Environmental Health Risks: Gendered impacts of air pollution, water contamination, and climate change on women (Click Here)
- Imagination as the Blueprint of Reality (Click Here)
- Constitution for All: Rethinking Gender Inclusive Governance in Pakistan (Click Here)
- Rethinking Reforms Process in Balochistan: Innovation and Leadership at BCSA (Click Here)
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- The FY 2025–26 Budget and Its Impact on Pakistan's IT & ITeS Sector (Click Here)
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- Transparency Through Open Data: Key to Reforming Governance in Pakistan (Click Here)
- From Reports to Reality: Why Pakistan Ranks Last in Global Gender Gap Index (Click Here)
- From Policy to People: Rethinking Governance with Design Thinking (Click Here)
- Floods, Heatwaves, and Hope: Reimagining Agriculture in a Warming Pakistan (Click Here)
- The Fight for Transparent Access to Information in Pakistan (Click Here)
- Life without Autonomy: Understanding Our Culture of Dependency (Click Here)
- Prioritizing Citizens Beyond the Ballot (Click Here)
- Solving the corruption challenge: The key may lie with the citizens. (Click Here)
- Citizens' Inclusion and Accountability is the Key to Improved Governance and Efficient Public Sector Institutions (Click Here)
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- Privatization of Schools in Punjab (Click Here)
- Water Governance Challenges in Pakistan (Click Here)
- Consumer Protection in Pakistan (Click Here)