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PROGRESS, PARADOXES AND POSSIBILITIES IN PAKISTAN

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Executive Summary

Pakistan enters 2026 at a moment defined by paradox: visible progress alongside deep structural fragility. Across science and innovation, politics, diplomacy, the economy, and climate governance, the country demonstrates resilience and capability, yet struggles to convert participation, activity, and aspiration into sustained power, legitimacy, and transformation.

The International Day of Women and Girls in Science highlights this contradiction most clearly. Pakistan has achieved near gender parity in science education, with women comprising almost half of all science graduates and a clear majority in medical and life sciences. Yet this numerical inclusion has not translated into influence.

This pattern of participation without power extends into the political sphere. January 2026 was marked by constitutional contestation rather than institutional dialogue, as opposition forces framed the post-election environment as a crisis of legitimacy and rule of law. While this narrative broadened the language of dissent beyond partisan politics, it also revealed the limits of mobilisation under a securitised state response. Politics increasingly operates through symbolism and confrontation rather than negotiation, narrowing space for democratic mediation and reinforcing public distrust.

Diplomatically, Pakistan remains active across global forums but constrained by limited leverage. Engagements with China, the European Union, the United States, and multilateral institutions reflect a country managing risk rather than shaping outcomes. Economic dependence, sanctions regimes, and transactional alliances have reduced strategic autonomy, even as Pakistan seeks relevance through norm-based advocacy on issues such as water security and conflict resolution. The result is visibility without influence, presence without agenda-setting power.

Economically, short-term stabilisation masks long-term vulnerability. Rising remittances have cushioned the external account, even as exports decline and the current account slips back into deficit when domestic activity revives. Growth projections remain modest and fragile, increasingly underwritten by labour migration rather than productivity gains. Energy sector dysfunction, industrial closures, and weak agricultural value chains continue to cap inclusive growth, translating macro-economic stress into acute social consequences, including large-scale job losses and urban precarity.

These pressures converge most starkly in the humanitarian and environmental domain. Chronic water scarcity, exemplified by Quetta's deepening crisis, and extreme air pollution in major cities illustrate governance failures rather than knowledge gaps. At the same time, Pakistan's ambitious climate commitments contrast sharply with limited fiscal capacity and weak enforcement, risking a widening gap between climate policy and lived reality.

International Day of Women and Girls in Science

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Every year on 11 February, the International Day of Women and Girls in Science invites the world to reflect on a fundamental question: *who gets to produce knowledge, and at what cost?* In Pakistan, this question carries particular weight. Women and girls have made remarkable strides in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) despite operating within deeply entrenched structural constraints. Their achievements are real and measurable, yet the systems meant to sustain and scale their participation remain fragile, uneven, and often exclusionary.

Participation Without Power

Pakistan presents a striking paradox. On the surface, women's participation in science education appears encouraging. According to UNESCO, women constitute [around 47-50%](#) of science graduates in Pakistan, a proportion that compares favourably with many countries in the Global South. In medical colleges, women routinely account for over 60% of enrolled students, and in disciplines such as biotechnology, environmental sciences, and pharmacy, female enrollment has steadily increased over the last two decades.

Yet this numerical progress masks a sharp attrition further along the scientific pipeline. Data from the Pakistan Council for Science and Technology (PCST) and Higher Education Commission (HEC) indicate that women represent [less than 20%](#) of active researchers, and an even smaller fraction occupy senior academic or decision-making positions in scientific institutions. In engineering, women make up fewer than 10% of the workforce, despite rising graduation rates. Only around 4.9% of engineering supervisory positions are held by women in Pakistan. The result is a system where women *enter* science in significant numbers but struggle to *remain, advance, or lead* within it.

Structural Barriers Beyond the Classroom

The barriers facing women in science in Pakistan are not rooted in their ability or aspiration. They are systemic. First, [mobility and safety constraints](#) disproportionately affect women researchers. Fieldwork, laboratory hours, conferences, and postings often require travel or late working hours, which are still socially discouraged or logistically unsafe for many women. These constraints limit exposure, collaboration, and publication opportunities, the currency of scientific advancement.

Second, [institutional cultures remain male-dominated](#). Studies on higher education in Pakistan consistently highlight implicit bias in hiring, promotion, authorship credit, and grant allocation. Women scientists report being steered toward teaching-heavy roles, while research leadership and lab control remain concentrated among men.

Third, the [care economy penalty](#) is severe. Pakistan lacks structured re-entry pathways for women who take career breaks due to marriage, childbirth, or caregiving. Unlike many countries, there are limited post-doctoral fellowships, tenure clock extensions, or childcare support mechanisms tailored for women scientists. As a result, many highly trained women exit the scientific workforce at precisely the stage where their expertise peaks.

Achievements That Redefine Possibility

Despite persistent structural constraints, Pakistani women scientists have made transformative contributions across public health, climate science, and technological innovation, often operating with limited institutional support and minimal public recognition. Their work not only sustains critical research ecosystems but also reshapes how science connects with policy, communities, and future generations.

In public health, women researchers have played central roles in epidemiology, virology, and health systems research, particularly during moments of national crisis. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Pakistani women scientists were among the leading contributors to disease surveillance, diagnostics, and public communication. Female virologists and epidemiologists working at national and provincial laboratories, including the National Institute of Health, carried out PCR testing, genomic surveillance, and real-time data reporting under intense pressure and severe resource constraints. At the policy level, figures such as [Dr. Sania Nishtar](#) exemplified how scientific expertise could be translated into large-scale governance responses, linking epidemiological evidence with social protection and health system reform.

In technology and innovation, women scientists and researchers are challenging assumptions that Pakistan's innovation ecosystem is inherently male-dominated. Women-led startups and research groups are advancing applied work in artificial intelligence, health technology, and agricultural biotechnology, frequently operating with limited access to venture capital or institutional incubation. A prominent example is Dr. Sara Saeed Khurram, whose work with Sehat Kahani integrates medical research, digital platforms, and health systems innovation to address both healthcare access gaps and women's exclusion from the labour force. Similar efforts by women principal investigators in universities and research centres have produced advances in diagnostics, data science, and biotech, often relying on international collaborations rather than domestic R&D pipelines. These cases underscore that the primary barriers are not capability or ambition, but access to capital, networks, and sustained institutional support.

Perhaps most importantly, women scientists in Pakistan play a critical yet largely invisible role as mentors, institution-builders, and norm-setters. Across public-sector universities and research institutions, senior women faculty supervise graduate research, lead ethics review boards, reform curricula, and create informal support systems for early-career researchers, often without formal recognition or workload adjustment. Through teaching, supervision, and advocacy, they are quietly reshaping what scientific authority and leadership look like for the next generation. This form of intellectual and emotional labour sustains research cultures and normalises women's leadership in laboratories and classrooms, yet remains largely absent from promotion criteria and funding assessments.

Addressing this imbalance requires gender-responsive research funding, promotion frameworks that value applied impact and mentorship, and deliberate efforts to recognise women as scientific leaders rather than peripheral contributors.

Political Updates

January 2026 underscored the depth of Pakistan's political stalemate, marked less by institutional dialogue than by competing claims to legitimacy and shrinking space for conventional opposition politics.

The most prominent development was the intensification of mobilisation by the opposition alliance Tehreek Tahafuz-i-Ayeen Pakistan (TTAP), which used an All Parties Conference in Karachi to formally challenge the credibility of the [February 8, 2024, general elections](#). By demanding an independent probe into alleged rigging and invoking Article 6 of the Constitution, the alliance escalated the political discourse from electoral reform to constitutional rupture, signalling that it views the current political order as fundamentally illegitimate rather than merely flawed.



Source: Dawn News

TTAP's rhetoric went beyond elections to articulate a broader narrative of institutional erosion. Its manifesto linked alleged electoral manipulation to what it described as the systematic weakening of judicial independence, citing constitutional amendments, judges' transfers, and recent disqualifications as evidence of executive overreach. The repeated naming of individual judges and the demand for the release of political prisoners, including Imran Khan, framed the crisis as one of rule of law rather than partisan grievance. This framing is politically significant: it seeks to broaden opposition appeal beyond PTI's base by anchoring protest in constitutionalism, civil liberties, media freedom, and provincial rights.



Source: Pakistan Today

At the same time, the political moment revealed the limits of street power under current conditions. As [February 8](#) approaches, TTAP's internal reassessment, reported as a possible shift from mass rallies to wheel-jam or shutter-down tactics, reflected both heightened state pressure and doubts about mobilisation capacity, particularly outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Sources within PTI openly acknowledged that public support alone does not translate into leverage within Pakistan's prevailing power equation.

This quiet recalibration suggests a growing recognition within the opposition that confrontational mobilisation carries high costs with uncertain returns, especially in Punjab, where enforcement is strongest.

The state's posture, meanwhile, has been one of containment rather than accommodation. Restrictions on assemblies, pressure on media outlets through advertising bans, and continued incarceration of high-profile opposition figures have narrowed the arena for competitive politics without offering a credible pathway for de-escalation. As a result, politics has drifted toward symbolic confrontation: anniversaries, protest calls, counter-narratives, and constitutional claims, with little evidence of structured negotiation or institutional mediation.

Diplomatic Landscape

January 2026 exposed the underlying fragility of Pakistan's diplomatic posture more clearly than any single "success" narrative might suggest. Across engagements with China, the European Union, the United States, Iran, India, and the United Nations, Pakistan appeared active and visible, yet constrained by limited leverage, economic dependence, and shrinking strategic autonomy. The month's diplomacy was less about shaping outcomes and more about managing risk and signalling relevance in a rapidly polarising international system.



Source: Pexels

Pakistan's interaction with a Chinese technology delegation led by [Leviathan Group](#) was framed publicly as a sign of growing confidence in the country's digital ecosystem. Analytically, however, it reflected a deeper concern: Pakistan's traditional development model, centred on infrastructure-heavy Chinese financing, is no longer sufficient or sustainable. The turn toward digital infrastructure, big data centres, and smart technologies indicates an awareness in Islamabad that future relevance lies in services, human capital, and data.

Yet the delegation's exploratory tone also exposed Pakistan's credibility gap. Persistent regulatory volatility, weak intellectual property protection, energy shortages, and policy reversals continue to deter long-term tech investment. The meeting, therefore, symbolised aspiration more than transformation, a reminder that Pakistan's digital diplomacy is running ahead of its institutional capacity.

This credibility challenge was even more evident in Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif's renewed call for the timely implementation of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects. After nearly a decade of CPEC, the emphasis on "implementation" is itself an admission of accumulated delays, governance failures, and trust deficits. While the rhetoric of an "all-weather friendship" remains intact, the relationship has entered a more transactional phase. China's patience is no longer unconditional, and Pakistan's repeated assurances underscore anxiety about slipping from being a strategic partner to a risk-prone borrower. The celebration of 75 years of diplomatic ties, while symbolically powerful, could not fully obscure the reality that Pakistan's bargaining position within CPEC is weaker than it was at inception

In contrast, EU praise for amendments to the Pakistan Penal Code was tightly linked to safeguarding GSP+ benefits rather than reflecting a broader rights-based foreign policy shift. While meetings with Ambassador Raimundas Karoblis reinforced cooperation, the underlying dynamic was asymmetrical: Pakistan must continuously demonstrate compliance to retain access, while the EU incurs little political cost.

Legal reform here functions as diplomatic currency, exchanged to prevent economic deterioration rather than to reposition Pakistan as a normative leader.



Source: Tribune

At the United Nations, Pakistan's statements on Yemen were principled and legally sound, with Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad advocating inclusive dialogue and condemning the detention of UN personnel. Yet this diplomacy also revealed a structural contradiction. Pakistan consistently defends multilateralism because it relies on it; however, the global system Pakistan appeals to is steadily losing coercive power. While such positions enhance Pakistan's moral standing, they have diminishing capacity to influence outcomes on the ground, raising questions about the practical returns of rules-based advocacy in a world increasingly governed by force and veto power.



Source: Arab News


The most problematic diplomatic development of the month was Pakistan's participation in US President Donald Trump's proposed "Board of Peace." While officially framed as an opportunity for conflict resolution, the initiative raises serious strategic and normative concerns. The board's ambiguous mandate, lack of legal grounding, and potential to sideline the UN risk normalising parallel governance structures driven by great-power preferences.

Pakistan's decision to join, particularly when India hesitated due to [Kashmir-related fears](#), may appear tactically clever, but it carries long-term risks. Islamabad risks endorsing a precedent where global conflict resolution is outsourced to ad hoc, personality-driven mechanisms rather than institutional frameworks. Moreover, any assumption that such a body would advance Pakistan's position on Kashmir underestimates the transactional nature of US foreign policy and overestimates Pakistan's influence within US-led constructs.

Energy diplomacy further underscored Pakistan's constrained agency. The decision to shelve the [Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline](#) unless a US sanctions waiver is secured was economically rational but diplomatically revealing. Despite Iran's willingness to extend the agreement, Pakistan's choices remain tightly circumscribed by Washington's sanctions regime, surplus LNG imports, and IMF-conditioned fiscal realities. This episode highlighted a persistent pattern: Pakistan maintains bilateral goodwill but lacks the economic sovereignty to act on it. The shelving of the pipeline is not merely an energy decision; it is evidence of Pakistan's diminished strategic autonomy in a sanctions-dominated global economy.

By contrast, Pakistan adopted a more assertive posture in response to India's unilateral suspension of the [Indus Waters Treaty](#). Ambassador Usman Jadoon's framing of water as a weapon and a systemic global risk was a deliberate attempt to internationalise the dispute. This was one of the few areas where Pakistan set the narrative rather than merely responding to it. However, internationalisation is not enforcement. While Pakistan may succeed in shaping discourse ahead of the 2026 UN Water Conference, it still lacks effective mechanisms to compel compliance, underscoring the limits of normative escalation without material leverage.

January 2026 revealed a Pakistan that is diplomatically present everywhere but powerful almost nowhere. The state is active, articulate, and norm-aware, yet persistently operating from a position of vulnerability. Much of its diplomacy is reactive, aimed at damage control rather than agenda-setting. Pakistan is trying to remain relevant in systems it does not control, comply with rules it did not shape, and hedge within increasingly transactional alliances.



Source: Dialogue Earth

Economic Outlook

January presents a classic Pakistani paradox where the external account is being stabilised by people leaving the country and sending money home, while the domestic economy struggles to produce tradable value at scale.

The clearest signal came from the remittances, the divergence. Remittances surged to about \$3.6bn in December 2025, while [exports fell roughly 20%](#) to around \$2.32bn, a sharp indicator that Pakistan's external footing is being propped up more by migrant income than by competitiveness at home. This matters because remittances behave like a social shock absorber (they protect household consumption), but they do not automatically rebuild industrial capability. In Pakistan's case, they can even mask competitiveness decline, stabilising the rupee and import capacity while exporters face weak incentives, high costs, and policy unpredictability.



Source: Pixels

That same tension explains why the current account slipped back into deficit in the first half of FY26. The deficit itself ([about \\$1.17bn](#)) is not yet catastrophic, but the direction is telling: as soon as domestic activity picks up, imports respond faster than exports, and the external account deteriorates again. In other words, Pakistan is still running an economic engine that accelerates on imported fuel, machinery, energy inputs, and intermediate goods, without a commensurate rise in export earnings.

This is why January's growth narrative split into competing forecasts that are all "plausible" but point to different risks. The IMF's updated view put Pakistan around [3.2% growth](#), explicitly hinting that resilience is narrow and sector-driven. Meanwhile, the SBP revised its FY26 growth range upward to [3.75-4.75%](#), arguing that commodity-producing sectors and large-scale manufacturing momentum were strengthening, and projecting reserves rising toward \$18bn+ by June 2026 and around \$20bn by end-2026.

S&P Global Market Intelligence broadly endorsed the [improving trajectory](#) (with its own numbers), but it also flagged downside risks tied to tariffs, commodity volatility, and geopolitical fragmentation, exactly the kind of shocks Pakistan struggles to absorb. The point is not “who is right”; the point is that Pakistan can post moderate growth without repairing the model, and that model still breaks under external pressure.

January’s labour-market signals were blunt: the state itself is leaning into exporting labour as a macro strategy. The government’s target of [800,000 overseas jobs](#) this year, paired with new skills initiatives and a lower minimum age for women’s overseas employment, is presented as an opportunity, but it is also a tacit admission that [domestic job creation](#) is not keeping pace with the population and aspirations. When a country’s most bankable export is its workers, remittances become both a lifeline and a warning sign: they keep the economy afloat while quietly draining it of talent and future taxpayers.

A more unusual and politically charged January development was the narrative that Pakistan may be emerging as a [defence exporter](#), with analysts discussing a pipeline of potential orders large enough to change the export conversation if even partially realised. This deserves sober scrutiny. Defence exports can diversify earnings, deepen engineering capability, and generate long-tail revenues (maintenance, upgrades, spares). But they are also volatile: they depend on geopolitics, state-to-state financing, and reputational cycles. A pipeline is not booked revenue, and the sector’s state-led structure means spillovers into broad-based employment and civilian productivity are not automatic. The risk is that Pakistan treats a possible defence windfall as a substitute for fixing textiles, agriculture value chains, and energy pricing, when it should be treated as a complement, not a replacement.



Source: The Print

Underneath these macro headlines sat the old constraint that never really left: energy-sector dysfunction. Circular debt rising again to around [Rs1.689 trillion](#) in July-December FY26 showed that even after injections and refinancing, the system continues to regenerate arrears through losses, governance gaps, and non-recovery. This is not merely an accounting problem. It is a growth ceiling: it keeps industrial energy expensive and unreliable, it pressures fiscal space, and it creates recurring moments when tariffs must rise, feeding inflation risk precisely when the SBP wants to keep disinflation credible.

Agriculture, too, remained a structural drag in the month's outlook discussions, partly because flood impacts were still being priced into growth expectations, and partly because Pakistan's productivity story in crops has been weak over decades. The policy conversation increasingly recognises that [raising yields](#) alone is not enough: reducing post-harvest losses, moving into higher-value crops, and building export-oriented value chains are where durable rural income growth could come from. (This is crucial because Pakistan's "growth" is politically fragile when it doesn't translate into rural livelihoods and food-price stability.)

Economic distress translated directly into social fallout in Faisalabad, where the shutdown of more than 150 industrial units reportedly rendered around [150,000 workers jobless](#). These closures, attributed to security concerns, policy uncertainty, and high operating costs, point to the fragility of Pakistan's urban labour markets. For a city long considered the backbone of industrial employment, the layoffs signal not just an economic slowdown but a humanitarian risk: sudden income loss, informalisation, and heightened pressure on already thin social safety nets.

Government assurances during the Board of Investment's visit highlighted intent, but also revealed how industrial survival increasingly depends on ad hoc facilitation rather than predictable policy and infrastructure support.



Source: Getty Images

Yes, reserves and inflation trends improved and monetary policy began to look forward rather than backward. But the drivers of that stability, remittances, demand compression, and cautious credit conditions, are not the same as the drivers of transformation. Exports are still sliding, the current account still turns negative when activity revives, and the state is openly planning for large-scale overseas employment because it cannot yet guarantee large-scale domestic opportunity.

Security and Governance

At least [15 militants](#) were killed in a series of coordinated security operations across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in mid-January 2026, highlighting the sustained intensity of counterterrorism activity in the province. According to ISPR, 13 members of the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, described by the military as part of "Fitna-al-Khawarij," were killed in two intelligence-based operations in Bannu and Kurram, where security forces engaged militant hideouts following actionable intelligence.



Source: Pakistan Today

In a separate incident in Dera Ismail Khan, two armed attackers were shot dead during a clash with police after they targeted a check-post, leaving one police constable injured. The operations form part of a wider nationwide campaign that saw more than 75,000 intelligence-based operations in 2025, even as official data indicates a continued rise in militant attacks, underlining the volatile security environment in Pakistan's western regions.

Social and Humanitarian Updates

One of the most stark humanitarian signals this month came from [Quetta's deepening water crisis](#), which has evolved into a chronic urban emergency. Entire neighbourhoods in the provincial capital remain unconnected to piped water in 2026, forcing households into permanent dependence on private tanker markets. Groundwater depletion, falling by several metres annually, has reached existential levels, driven by unregulated tube wells, solar-powered pumping, and decades of planning failure.

What makes Quetta's case particularly telling is that the crisis is no longer confined to informal settlements; it now affects established urban localities, salaried households, and public institutions alike. Judicial intervention by the Balochistan High Court, while symbolically important, underscored a deeper governance breakdown: water scarcity here is not caused by lack of knowledge or solutions, but by regulatory paralysis, political avoidance, and institutional fragmentation. The city's reliance on groundwater without recharge mechanisms has effectively turned a natural constraint into a man-made humanitarian risk.

Beyond Quetta, water stress emerged as a national development concern, reinforced by warnings from the World Bank that Pakistan is among the [world's most water-stressed countries](#). Inefficient irrigation systems, weak agricultural practices, and uncontrolled groundwater extraction are wasting vast volumes of water while undermining long-term food security. While pilot modern irrigation projects show promising efficiency gains, their limited scale highlights a familiar pattern: innovation exists, but replication and enforcement do not. The humanitarian implication is clear: water scarcity is no longer a future threat but a present multiplier of poverty, rural distress, and urban instability.



Source: Pexels

Pakistan is not facing a single social crisis, but a convergence of slow-moving emergencies rooted in governance failure. Water scarcity, job losses, and service breakdowns are no longer isolated sectoral issues; they are interconnected pressures shaping everyday life for millions. Without structural reforms, the country risks normalising humanitarian stress as a permanent condition rather than an exception.

Social and Humanitarian Updates

The start of 2026 highlighted the widening gap between Pakistan's climate ambitions and the lived environmental crisis confronting its cities and communities. On paper, Pakistan has committed to an expansive climate transition, estimating it will require [\\$566 billion](#) to meet its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) 3.0 targets by 2035, including deep emissions cuts, a rapid shift toward renewable energy, and large-scale adoption of electric vehicles. The rollout of the Pakistan Green Taxonomy and new Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure guidelines signalled an effort to align finance with climate goals and attract green investment. Yet these frameworks remain aspirational in a country where fiscal space is limited, and climate finance flows are uncertain.



Source: Reuters

On the ground, environmental stress continued to intensify. Lahore once again ranked as the most polluted city in the world, with air quality reaching [“hazardous” levels](#) that pose severe public health risks, particularly to children and the elderly. Despite seasonal mitigation measures, persistent smog underscored structural failures in urban planning, transport regulation, industrial emissions control, and agricultural practices. Together, these developments reveal a contradiction: Pakistan is planning for long-term climate transformation while struggling to manage immediate environmental emergencies. Without sustained investment, enforcement, and governance reform, climate commitments risk remaining policy declarations in a country already living the consequences of climate inaction.

Reading Recommendations

- Mental Health Access for Women: Cultural Stigma and Systemic Barriers ([Click Here](#))
- Concrete Over Canopy: The Unmaking of Islamabad's Green Capital Dream ([Click Here](#))
- Menstrual Health Management: Policy Gaps, Access to Hygiene Products and Cultural Taboos ([Click Here](#))
- Climate Change and Food Security in Pakistan: A Crisis on Our Plate ([Click Here](#))
- Environmental Health Risks: Gendered impacts of air pollution, water contamination, and climate change on women ([Click Here](#))
- Imagination as the Blueprint of Reality ([Click Here](#))
- Constitution for All: Rethinking Gender Inclusive Governance in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- Rethinking Reforms Process in Balochistan: Innovation and Leadership at BCSA ([Click Here](#))
- Sports as a Tool for Preventing Violent Extremism in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- Groundwater Recharge: Reviving the Hidden Lifeline ([Click Here](#))
- Selling Misinformation ([Click Here](#))
- Data-Driven Cities: Lessons from World for Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- The FY 2025–26 Budget and Its Impact on Pakistan's IT & ITeS Sector ([Click Here](#))
- Planting for Survival: Pakistan's Path Out of the Heat ([Click Here](#))
- Transparency Through Open Data: Key to Reforming Governance in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- From Reports to Reality: Why Pakistan Ranks Last in Global Gender Gap Index ([Click Here](#))
- From Policy to People: Rethinking Governance with Design Thinking ([Click Here](#))
- Floods, Heatwaves, and Hope: Reimagining Agriculture in a Warming Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- The Fight for Transparent Access to Information in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- Life without Autonomy: Understanding Our Culture of Dependency ([Click Here](#))
- Prioritizing Citizens Beyond the Ballot ([Click Here](#))
- Solving the corruption challenge: The key may lie with the citizens. ([Click Here](#))
- Citizens' Inclusion and Accountability is the Key to Improved Governance and Efficient Public Sector Institutions ([Click Here](#))
- Digital Community Policing ([Click Here](#))
- Privatization of Schools in Punjab ([Click Here](#))
- Water Governance Challenges in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))
- Consumer Protection in Pakistan ([Click Here](#))